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In this project, I will discuss topics in American political behavior, specifically, the 
role labor unions play in determining the political participation of their membership. 
In the face of diminishing resources, declining membership, and unfriendly state 
legislatures, labor unions employ a whole host of mobilization tactics to achieve 
desired electoral outcomes. Traditional strategies such as in-person or member-to-
member contact, mail or phone contact, and online digital engagement has all 
required a fresh start to keep up with the changing campaign environment. 
This project offers three different examinations of field experiments conducted by 
labor unions in three different electoral contexts. The first experiment tests two 
competing Get Out the Vote (GOTV) mobilization methods in the August 2014 
primary elections. Union members in two states were randomly assigned to receive: 
1) A letter grading their past voting performance or; 2) a letter encouraging them to 
‘Make a Plan’ to vote or; 3) were placed in the control group and received no contact. 
  
The treatments pushed members either to return their mail ballots or to vote early, in-
person. The second experiment investigates what type of phone script is most 
effective at encouraging union members to connect to their state representative’s 
office, and to advocate for or against a certain piece of legislation. This chapter builds 
on one previous field experiment to determine whether these phone scripts are a 
viable way to encourage members to interact with their elected officials, and which 
type of script language encourages union members (and constituents) to contact their 
legislator.  Finally, my third field experiment focuses on two canvassing experiments 
conducted by the state affiliate of a national labor union before the April 1st, 2014 
election. Targets of the membership organization were randomly assigned to 
treatment and to control groups. Post-election turnout records determined that the 
canvass successfully stimulated turnout among those who received a face-to-face 
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This dissertation presents the results from the unique opportunity I had to 
design and test the strategies unions used to mobilize their members toward political 
action. The project consists of three randomized controlled field experiments. When 
these experiments were conducted, I was employed by the membership organization 
in question. I worked as part of the data and analytics staff for each of these 
organizations and was directly responsible for the research design, randomization, 
and analysis for each of the field experiments. In the case of the canvass experiment 
(Chapter 4), my partner organization had already generated the scripts for the 
canvass, and I provided direction based on best practices before randomizing the lists 
that were then assigned into turf for walk lists. For the papers in Chapter 2 and 3, I 
was directly responsible for generating the messages to test. As such, this project 
presents an opportunity to pioneer the process of injecting social science theories and 
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The unexpected results of the 2016 Presidential Election left many Democratic political 
organizations spending the concluding months of 2016 in deep introspection. Predictive models, 
polling, and experts everywhere seemed convinced of Hillary Clinton’s electoral success. When 
this did not happen on Election Day, pro-Clinton groups began to take stock of what they had 
done, what happened, and how they could have fallen short of a presidential victory. Chief 
among those conducting this exercise were labor unions. They had spent considerable monetary 
resources and sent thousands of their members to critical electoral states to canvass, call, and 
otherwise engage voters on Clinton’s behalf. In the end, they had nothing to show for it. 
As the dust settled, critical patterns emerged. Support among labor union households (and 
other typical Democratic-strongholds) in key states did not materialize for Hillary Clinton in the 
same way they had for Barack Obama in 2012 and 2008. Circling around the key electoral states 
and union strongholds in the Midwest like Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, the exit polls 
told a clear story of underperformance. In Michigan, Clinton dramatically underperformed 
Obama’s 2012 and 2008 support levels among union households. While she carried union 
households in Michigan by 13 points, Obama carried union households by 33 points and 2012 
and 36 points in 2008 (CNN Exit Polls 2016). In Wisconsin, she carried union households by 15 
points while Obama carried them by 32 points in 2012 and 22 points1. Even further 
disheartening, Donald Trump’s margin of victory in each of these union-dense states was slight.  
                                                 




He won Michigan by 10,704 votes, Pennsylvania by 67,416 votes and Wisconsin by 22,177 
votes. A November 10th Politico article summed up the mood, “Organized labor is searching for 
answers after union households failed to turn out for Hillary Clinton despite a massive voter 
mobilization effort -- a sharp departure from decades of union support for Democratic 
presidential candidates” (Hesson and Levine, 2016). 
 The 2016 election cemented what many within labor organizations already knew: Labor 
unions can no longer assume their members will turn out and vote for who their union has 
endorsed. As Eric Heggie, the National Field Director of the United Automobile Workers 
(UAW) explains, “Union members are like every other American, but they just happen to benefit 
from working within the structure of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. This means that their 
support for issues, causes, and candidates is not always automatically determined by what their 
Union decides to support, but more often by demographics of those members.” (Heggie, 2017) 
Labor unions cannot be frivolous in their communication to their members around political 
issues. They are not the sole determinant of the political action of their members. The tactics and 
communication used by labor unions to mobilize and persuade their members must be driven by 
testing.  While some union members have fully embraced a culture of field experiments, others 
are just beginning the process.  Working America, the community affiliate of the American 
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), has been 
conducting field experiments since 2008. Their Political Director, Matt Morrison, explains how 
prolific the use of testing has become: “We use testing to refine targeting through EIPs 
[Experiment Informed Programs]; [we] compare the efficacy of voter contact canvass models to 
measure persuasion and turnout effects. We are examining ways to make the testing even more 




(Morrison, 2017) Conversely, other unions are just beginning to incorporate testing into their 
programs, “We have begun to implement testing on different forms of communication, carrying 
out a test post-election during our survey process to test the click-through rate based on the 
gender of the sender,” Heggie of UAW says. “Testing has increased as it was not 
institutionalized previously, but we are working to try and do that.” (Heggie, 2017) Regardless of 
the testing culture within a specific union, leadership agrees that ignoring the results of 2016 and 
not employing data-driven decision-making could lead to the extinction of the American Labor 
Movement.  
This dissertation will focus on testing conducted by labor unions to optimize 
communication in order to generate greater political participation among their members. Given 
the grim outlook for organized labor in the United States, evaluation of voter mobilization 
programs conducted by labor unions is mission critical for their survival and relevance. Prior to 
discussing the three different field experiments conducted by labor unions, I review some of the 
existing literature on mass membership organizations and political participation. I will then cover 
how labor unions operate within the modern American political environment. Finally, I offer the 
unique contributions of the research in this dissertation and provide a roadmap for the chapters 
ahead.      
Mass Membership Organizations and Political Participation 
There is a strong observed correlation between membership in mass organizations and 
participation in electoral politics. Mass organizations have been defined broadly to include 
political parties, civic organizations, professional associations, labor unions and the like. 




cause of participation2. Organizational membership shapes members view of the political world, 
and organizations act as a resource to subsidize the cost of political learning for their members 
(Verba and Nie, 1972; Conover, 1984). Other research indicates that membership in mass 
organizations increases mobilization via indirect mechanisms: Members foster leadership and 
participation skills and then use them in a political context (Leighey, 1996). Additionally, 
members of a group are more likely to be exposed to a more politically active social network.  
This may result in increasing their likelihood to participate due to social norms and social 
rewards/sanctions (Fowler, 2005; Klofstad, 2010; Sinclair, 2012). Thus, membership in mass 
organizations is a major determinant of political participation. 
Mass organizations offer citizens an opportunity to pursue public and private goods 
through collective action. Some of these goods are non-political, such as unions engaging in 
collective bargaining, professional associations providing training, or civic organizations 
coordinating charitable donations. For many mass organizations, at least some of these public 
and private goods are pursued through collective political action. Mass organizations also offer 
members an opportunity to pursue social rewards. In return, these mass organizations provide 
members a privileged position within the larger, pluralistic political environment 
(Schattchneider, 1960; Dahl, 1974).  In order to coordinate collective political action by their 
membership, mass organizations offer their members cognitive shortcuts to make political 
decisions such as information about policies, candidate endorsements, and reminders to vote. 
Mass membership organizations also deliver social rewards and sanctions for participating in 
collective political action via formal and informal monitoring of compliance with group norms 
about voting. The activities by and within mass membership organizations are thought to 
                                                 
2 e.g. Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960; Miller et al., 1981; 




increase the levels of participation of group members (e.g. Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et 
al., 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Miller et al., 1981; Rosenstone and 
Hansen, 1993; Radcliff and Davis, 2000; Beck et al., 2008). 
Organizations often spend considerable resources to mobilize their members, as well as 
sympathetic nonmembers in the electorate-at-large. Since they are a known and trusted source of 
information to members, membership organizations may enjoy advantages in communicating 
about elections. Mass organizations’ advantage communicating with their members and the 
general public may increase with the strength of an organization in a community, For example, 
sharing enrollment within a population (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; 
Converse, 1964; Rosenstone and Hansen ,1993; Beck et al., 2008). However, recent research 
contends that membership organizations engaging in collective political action have declined due 
to a general decay in social capital. Putnam (1995; 2000) argues a general decline in political 
involvement stems from an aggregate loss in membership of all types and the consequent loss of 
social capital. The reduction of interaction provided by these organizations leads to a less 
engaged electorate. The simultaneous decline of politically oriented mass membership 
organizations and political participation (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Niemi and Weisburg, 
2001; c.f. McDonald and Popkin ,1991) reinforces the expectation that mass membership 
organizations contribute to political participation. 
The literature on mass membership organizations often focuses on labor unions. Labor 
unions were a major economic and political force in mid-twentieth century America when 
scholars were developing their understanding of the role of mass membership organization in 
political participation. Unions provide large economic private goods (wages and benefits, 




these economic goods provided by labor unions are inextricably tied to public policy about 
collective bargaining rights, public employee salaries, workplace regulations, and much more. 
As a result unions have strong incentives to engage in external collective political action. 
Union members can be difficult to mobilize since their decisions to join a union are often 
driven by employment choices and not political ones (as opposed to individuals that may self-
select into organizations or political parties). Additionally, many union members come from 
working-class backgrounds and may lack the basic knowledge to politically participate. Labor 
unions utilize three noteworthy processes to spur political action of their members: 1) labor 
unions cultivate organizational and civic skills of their members as a way to achieve 
organizational and political goals (Markowitze, 1998; Clawson, 2003; Sharpe, 2004); 2) unions 
shape the political identity of their members by encouraging collective acts (Fantasia 1989; 
Weinbaun, 2004; Nissen, 2010); and 3) unions directly mobilize their members (Rosenstone and 
Hansen, 1993; Asher et al., 2001; Meyer, 2007).  
Leighey and Nagler (2007) found that unions have a positive and statistically significant 
impact on individual voter turnout through two mechanisms: being a union member and residing 
in a state with a higher union membership. Unions increase participation among their members, 
and pro-union non-members (although at lower rates). The increase in aggregate turnout is a 
product of direct voter contact and indirect changes in social norms about voting. Gerber and 
Rogers (2009) note: “Anything that affects turnout directly also has a secondary effect through 
the induced change in [overall turnout]. Therefore, if there is a strong union or party organization 
in a town, turnout will increase directly as well as indirectly,” (p. 187). 
Previous studies of unions and political participation frequently focus on the outcomes of 




Davis, 2000; Radcliff, 2001). Individual level research shows that union members often support 
Democratic candidates (Sousa, 1993; Juravich and Shergold, 1988; Asher et al., 2001) and are 
much more likely to vote than nonunion citizens (Masters and Delaney, 1986; Freeman, 2003; 
Leighley and Nagley, 2007; Rosenfeld, 2010). Additionally, union members in states with high 
union densities have higher voting rates (Leighley and Nagler, 2007). Unions also influence 
outcomes (Democratic vote share) without influencing turnout (Sousa, 1993), but unions spend 
massive resources on mobilizing members to vote so they clearly see it as an important path to 
influencing electoral and other political outcomes. 
 Utilizing analysis of multiple publically available datasets, Kerrissey and Schofer (2013) 
find, “The effect of union membership is broad, spanning most types of political and civic 
involvement, including voting, protesting, signing petitions, association membership and so on” 
(p. 919). These effects are strongest among those with low levels of education. Unions provide 
training and mobilizing efforts tailored specifically to boost participation among low-education 
voters. Additionally, Harrison (2004) found that unions affect members differently and that 
unions have a higher importance in the structural life of men, African Americans, and the 
working class. Essentially, labor unions can close the participation gap for voters who, without 
membership to a labor union, might opt not to participate in the political process.  
These incentives and characteristics of unions provide a clear illustration of why a causal 
link is often assumed between mass organization membership and political participation. 
Therefore, unions should be seen as something of an easy case (Gerring, 2007) for demonstrating 
that organizational membership influences the effectiveness of political mobilization. 
Conversely, if union membership fails to improve electoral mobilization then it seems unlikely 




Labor Unions in Modern American Politics 
In 2016 public-sector labor unions found themselves in the middle of a Supreme Court 
case that would determine their relevancy in American politics for the foreseeable future. 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association centered on whether the 1977 case, Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education should be overruled, with public sector “agency shop” processes 
(meaning an employer may hire union or non-union workers, the employees need not join a 
union to remain employed but must pay “agency fees” to cover collective bargaining costs3), 
would be invalidated under the First Amendment. This would strip labor unions of their power to 
charge fees to nonmembers for the costs of representing them at the bargaining table, thus greatly 
weakening the ability of unions to collectively bargain, organize, politically agitate, etc. The 
anomalous death of conservative Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia led the Court to split in a 
4-4 decision. Thus, the lower court case was upheld and public-labor unions were able to let out 
an ever-so-slight collective sigh of relief. As explained by The Atlantic’s Charlotte Garden, 
“That [decision] alone is a victory for public unions, which will not be forced to divert member 
dues away from political activity in the middle of a presidential campaign season” (Garden, 
2016).  
The Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association was not the first challenge to public-
sector unions or labor unions in general and it will not be the last as similar cases make their way 
through lower courts. Recent trends have culminated to a point where labor unions find 
themselves fighting declining membership rates, anti-union laws and sentiment, unfriendly 
elected officials, and perhaps most important, the declining political involvement and voting 
rates in recent elections. About a fifth (20.1 percent) of wage and salaried workers belonged to a 
                                                 
3 Pynes, Joan. Human Resources Management for Public and Nonprofit Organizations. 2d ed. Hoboken, N.J.: John 




union in 1983. By 2014, that figure had declined to 11.1 percent. In 1954, unionization reached 
its highest levels, with 34.8 percent of all U.S. wage and salaried workers belonging to a union 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014; Congressional Research Service, 2014). Furthermore, while 
the public’s perception of labor unions has improved in recent years, it still remains lower than 
those within the labor movement would like. Approval soared above 70 percent when union 
membership was higher in the 1950s-1960s. Labor unions saw a sharp drop in their support in 
the early 2000s, which many attribute to the Great Recession of 2008. The advantages that union 
workers enjoyed when it came to their pay and benefits generated resentment among the non-
unionized workforce. Furthermore, the diminishing power of unions in the private sector greatly 
diminished their ability to agitate for better working conditions with their employer, 
subsequently affecting the rate at which wages increased for non-union workers.  James 
Surowiecki of The New Yorker noted the difference in labor union’s popularity between the 
Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of 2008 in a 2011 article stating: 
The bailouts of General Motors and Chrysler saved the jobs of tens of thousands of 
U.A.W. workers, but were enormously unpopular. In the midterm elections, voters in 
several states passed initiatives making it harder for unions to organize. Across the 
country, governors and mayors wrestling with budget shortfalls are blaming public-sector 
unions for the problems.  (Suroweicki, 2011)  
  Labor union’s favorability does seem to have recovered, as the opinions of unions has 
steadily been improving and is nearly recovered to levels seen prior to the Great Recession of 
2008. Currently approval rates now sit close to where they were in the early 1980s. Figure 1 

















Additionally, Pew Research notes in their 2013 national survey of 1,512 adults the effect 
the recession appears to have had on public views of labor unions: 
Public views of business corporations and labor unions, which had mostly been in 
the positive territory from the 1980s through the early 2000s, turned less 
favorable during the economic recession. And in August 2011, amid fears of a 
new economic downturn and widespread dissatisfaction with national conditions, 
favorable ratings for business and labor hit all-time lows. Since then, favorable 
opinions of business corporations have increased 17 points and positive views of 
labor unions have risen 10 points.  (Pew Research, 2013)   
Some research stipulates that unions are diminishing in power and have therefore lost 
their political impact (Goldfield, 1986; Dark, 1996; Levi, 2003). Faced with dilapidated union 
membership rates, general decline in political interest and participation, and increasing hostility 
to their policy, economic, and political agendas, unions have strong incentives to mobilize every 




member for collective political action to protect and enhance their standing politically and their 
ability to deliver the economic benefit that attracts and retains union members. Consistent with 
the broader findings of Putnam (1995, 2000) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) about the role 
of mass organizations, Leighey and Nagler (2007) find the shrinking membership of unions has 
an overall negative impact on aggregate voter turnout, but unions still play a critical role in 
mobilizing their members and supporters. 
Compounding the fluctuating public sentiment and declining rates of participation is the 
amount of right-to-work legislation passed at the state-level. Right-to-work laws, “prohibit union 
security agreements, or agreements between employers and labor unions, that govern the extent 
to which an established union can require employee’s membership, payment of union dues, or 
fees as condition of employment, either before or after hiring” (Legal Defense Foundation, 
1998). Twenty-six states currently have right-to-work provisions in their laws or state 
constitutions. States with union-dense industries like Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, and West 
Virginia have more recently become right-to-work states. In practicality, this means that labor 
unions have to work hard to actively recruit employees to become a union member. Furthermore, 
this means that the pool of money generated by union dues is much smaller in these states, 
making it even more difficult for labor unions to generate legislative and electoral traction to 
beat back anti-union policies. When unions do decide to expend resources in these states, they 
have to be strategic with their limited resources. In many cases, labor unions pour financial and 
logistical resources into states to fight these laws. During the 2016 presidential election, Missouri 
became a prime electoral target for labor unions as the election of a Republican governor would 
have led to the passage of right-to-work laws. Democrat State Representative Jake Hummel 




we don’t get Chris Koster elected, Missouri will very quickly be a right-to-work state.”4  While 
not a key swing state by any means (Missouri has consistently voted Republican in presidential 
election years), labor unions spent considerable resources guaranteeing the election of Democrat 
Chris Koster. Koster’s campaign received more than 2 million dollars in donations from labor 
unions5 and labor unions such as the AFL-CIO sent volunteers to canvass and phone bank voters 
on behalf of Koster. As the AFL-CIO’s Deputy Political Director Liz McElroy explains,  
Missouri wasn’t a priority state for many progressive groups or for the Democratic Party 
in 2016, but it was absolutely critical for us. We had to work to safeguard against  
Missouri becoming the 27th right-to-work state so we committed time and resources to 
the Governor’s race in Missouri where other groups were not as invested.” (McElroy, 
2017) 
In spite of the various obstacles American labor unions face, they remain a powerful 
force in American politics. The chart below outlines the reported turnout of union and non-union 
households from the American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys conducted in 








                                                 
4 (St. Louis Dispatch, 2016)  
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Since 1948, union households have consistently voted at higher rates than non-union 
households (with the exception of 1960). The reported turnout gap between these households 
was a high as 12 percentage points and averages just under six percentage points across 
presidential elections. While turnout overall has waxed and waned over time, unions households 
have consistently voted at a higher rate than non-union households. Additionally, reported 
turnout of union members has actually grown over time, increasing their power as part of the 
electorate and making the efforts of unions even more critical as they can shape elections as a 
powerful voting bloc.   
In 2013, FiveThirtyEight’s Nate Silver conducted an analysis examining the effects of 
union membership on Democratic voting.  He concluded that belonging to a union, even when 
controlling other demographic factors, was extremely important in determining the vote share for 
Barack Obama in 2012: 
Specifically, 64 percent of union members in the Annenberg data set voted for 
Barack Obama. By contrast, if these same voters were not members of unions but 
every other demographic characteristic were held constant, the analysis predicts 
that 52 percent of them would have voted for Mr. Obama anyway. Thus, the 
marginal impact of being a union member on the likelihood on voting for Mr. 
Obama was 12 percentage points (64 percent less 52 percent) on average. Because 
about 10 percent of voters in the study were union members, this boosted Mr. 
Obama’s overall vote share by 1.2 percentage points. (Silver, 2013) 
Where does all of this leave labor unions in a modern campaign context? They face quite 
a few, non-trivial hurdles: declining membership, declining voter participation, antagonistic 




political force in electing candidates and mobilizing their membership. There remains a key 
distinction between the union mobilization of the past and union mobilization in more recent 
elections: resources. Money generated by union dues has shrunk to a level where it is impossible 
to mail, canvass, or call each, individual member of a labor union. As a consequence, labor 
unions have to be strategic in not only which union members they target their political 
communication to, but also how and what to say to ensure members are participating in the 
political process. As Kris Garcia, former Political Data Director at the National Education 
Association explains, “We no longer have the luxury of assuming our members will vote in a 
given election. We have become more focused on member mobilization the last four cycles, 
implementing programs specifically aimed at making sure our members show up come Election 
Day.”6  The key way in which labor unions determine this is via large-scale field experiments. 
Political parties and non-partisan civic engagement groups have been conducting field 
experiments since 2005 (see Mann, 2006) and labor unions have also embraced this approach for 
measuring program effectiveness and establishing best practices. Natalie LeBlanc-Jackson, 
President of the California office for the Pivot Group, a firm specializing in direct mail, explains 
how the quantity of field experiments has increased over time, “We’ve gone from conducting 
one mail experiment a cycle to including them as a standard part of our scope of work that we 
pitch to clients in a matter of six years. As long as the budget is there, we push organizations and 
candidates to test their communication before rolling it out as program.” (LeBlanc-Jackson, 
2015) Unions are at the forefront of this new age of field experiments; whether it’s voting, 
communicating with elected officials, or taking other political actions, organizations are leaning 
on the previous lessons of social science to optimize their political programs and communication. 
                                                 




In that vein, the research presented in this dissertation covers various experimental projects 




An important contribution from this work is the research reflecting how real world 
organizations sought to spur their members to participate in politics. As a result, the findings will 
be part of the accumulating knowledge base these organizations use in the future (and in some 
cases, the lessons were utilized within the same election cycle). Each of the findings from these 
experiments will drive future resource allocation decisions for my partner organizations. 
However, no research project is perfect. This work encountered budget constraints, restrictions 
on the ability to deviate from a set of established best practices, and the inherent limitations in 
focusing on just one type of membership organization. These types of projects often lack the 
perfection achieved in more contained environments. Nevertheless, field experiments are often 
hard to come by, and the results are far more meaningful for both researcher and practitioner. 
Each paper in this proposal outlines the design, implementation, and the result of a field 
experiment aimed at testing the effectiveness of various mobilization methods. The field 
experiments in each chapter all meet Gerber and Green’s four criteria for “an ideal field 
experiment”: (1) the treatment resembles the intervention of interest in the world; (2) the 
participants resemble the actors who ordinarily encounter such interventions; (3) the context for 
the experiment resembles the context of interest; and (4) the outcomes resemble the actual 




Considering the myriad of variations between communication modes, communication 
timing, messenger type, etc. membership organizations and unions can utilize field experiments 
to decipher meaningful change versus random noise. Program evaluation allows for mass 
membership organizations to assess the overall impact of their specific programs as well as 
determine best practices. In each of the papers in this dissertation, the union wished to utilize a 
field experiment to determine if their previously used methods were actually working among 
their members.   
This project not only adds to the current literature, but the findings of this research also 
have larger implications for the study of political participation as well as specific commentary on 
union member participation. The first chapter contributes to the larger literature by measuring 
two competing GOTV tactics via letter and a live follow up phone call in two experiments. The 
first experiment aimed to mobilize members to return their mail ballot and the second 
encouraged members to cast their ballot prior to Election Day. In the first test of its kind, the 
experiment measured the treatment utilizing the union member’s past voting record (e.g. 
Davenport, 2009; Panagopoulos, 2009; Green, Gerber and Larimer, 2008) versus asking the 
member to “Make a Voting Plan” (e.g. Nickerson and Rogers, 2009; Rogers and Gerber, 2008). 
The subsequent chapter discusses an advocacy experiment aimed at determining whether an 
appeal to union members to reach out to their elected officials is effective. The experiment tests 
three different types of appeals to determine which is most effective. The last chapter outlines 
two canvassing experiments that took place during municipal elections in the spring of 2014. 
While at first glance the experiments seem to be standard canvassing experiments empirically 




treated effects all the more impressive7. Considering that a majority of previous research had 
utilized paid canvassers to achieve increases in turnout, I offer that utilizing volunteer canvassers 
may be just as effective (if not more) for organizations aiming to increase turnout.       
 
Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation will provide three instances of a labor union increasing the desired 
action rate of its members as measured by large-scale field experiment. Each experiment was 
conducted in a different state and electoral context. Each offers evidence that, despite declining 
membership rates, labor unions remain a powerful force in politically mobilizing their members. 
Chapter two discusses the impact of mobilizing union members to vote prior to Election 
Day. Here I offer the first comparison of two proven mobilization tactics: social pressure using a 
person’s previous vote history and walking the person through a “voting plan”. By conducting a 
field experiment in Arizona and Florida, states with large portions of the electorate casting a 
ballot prior to Election Day, I am able to conclude not only which treatment was more effective, 
but how treatment effects varied by vote method. 
Chapter three focuses on how varying language delivered via live phone call can 
influence the action rate of the person answering the phone. This test is one of a handful of 
advocacy experiments aimed at concluding whether or not an appeal to contact elected official is 
effective. Furthermore, it utilizes different scripts delivered to treatment groups to determine if 
there is a difference between script type and action rate among union members. 
                                                 
7 Intent-to-treat effect refers to the impact of being randomly assigned to the treatment whereas treatment-on-treated 





Chapter four provides an example of how labor unions can greatly impact the outcome of 
local elections. By utilizing volunteer canvassers in an off-year election, a local labor union was 
able to increase turnout in a citywide election. The novelty in this experiment is that the 
volunteer operation produced not only a statistically significant impact in turnout, but also an 
impact in-line with effect sizes produced by paid canvass operations. This offers a promising 
avenue of research for canvass field experiments, especially as organizations like labor unions 
face diminishing resources. 
Finally, I conclude my dissertation in chapter 5. I review the key findings presented in the 
preceding chapters. Additionally, I discuss future projects that will build on the analysis and 










MEASURING THE GOTV EFFORTS OF A NATIONAL LABOR UNION: RESULTS 
FROMTWO FILED EXPERIEMENTS 
 
Introduction 
Previous literature indicates that a voter’s likelihood of casting a ballot is tied to their 
social and political interactions (Gosnell, 1927; Eldersveld ,1956; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Putnam, 2000). These interactions become even more 
critical in less-salient elections, where there may be less media coverage or campaign activities 
by political parties and candidates (Green, Gerber and Nickerson, 2001). These facts are not lost 
on membership groups like labor unions who have a vested interest in an off year, local, or 
primary election where there is less competition for voter’s attention and their impact can be 
greater. These groups are constantly refining communication modes and mediums in order to 
determine which practices will cause a favorable outcome in the elections (where the group’s 
communication may be more valuable as there is less fanfare to compete with). This paper offers 
a look into one union’s efforts to mobilize its members in the 2014 primary election by 
encouraging members to take advantage of convenience voting reforms available in their state.  
 The fundamental contribution of this research is to determine which of two long standing 
Get-Out-The-Vote practices is most effective at increasing turnout and encouraging members to 
utilize early in-person voting (EIPV) and voting by mail (VBM): social pressure (i.e. a voter 
report card) or plan making (i.e. walking a voter through a voting plan).  It is worth noting that 
social pressure and plan-making have not been compared as GOTV tactics prior to this 
experiment. Previous field experiments have shown that EIPV and VBM recruitment increases 




study, 33 states and the District of Columbia allowed early voting, and 27 states, plus the District 
of Columbia permitted voters to cast a ballot via mail without an excuse (National Council of 
State Legislatures, 2014). A potential solution is to have membership organizations find ways to 
encourage participation among their members, and to encourage members to take advantage of 
convenience voting reform. 
 This paper proceeds as follows: First, I briefly review how these experiments are situated 
within the greater literature about organizational membership and political participation as well 
as voter mobilization strategy via early voting and voting by mail recruitment. Second, I describe 
the design of my field experiments conducted in partnership with a national labor union in 
Arizona and Florida. Third, I present the results of the field experiments. Finally, I conclude with 
a discussion of the implications of the results and what role labor unions can play in increasing 
the rates of convenience voting (i.e. voting by mail and voting early) and overall turnout going 
forward.   
Group Membership and Political Participation 
As discussed in the introduction, organizational membership deeply affects one’s 
political behavior (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 1954; Miller et al., 1965). This occurs 
for a number of reasons: 1)Organizations often act as a resource to subsidize the cost of political 
learning for their members (Verba and Nie, 1972; Conover, 1984); 2)Members often foster 
leadership and participation skills and then utilize those skills in a political context (Leighey, 
1996); and 3) Members of a group are more likely to be exposed to a more politically active 
social network, which in turn increases their likelihood to participate due to social norms and 




Membership organizations have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
individual voter turnout through two mechanisms: being an organization member and residing in 
a state with a higher group membership. Mass organizations increase participation among their 
members and non-group members although at lower rates (Leighey and Nagler, 2007).  
Convenience Voting Reforms and Opportunities for Mobilization 
Recruiting individuals to cast a ballot by mail has been an effective tactic for increasing 
participation across a wide variety of electoral contexts (Mann, 2013; Mann and Mayhew, 2013 
forthcoming; Mann and Kalla, 2013; Hanmer et al., 2015; Herrnson et al., 2015). Observational 
studies of allowing voting-by-mail (or no excuse absentee voting) expresses doubt as to whether 
implementing such “convenience voting” reforms increase aggregate participation or further 
exacerbate the gap between voters and non-voters (Menger et al., 2015; Burden et al., 2013; see 
Gronke et al., 2008 for a review). Political elites utilize vote by mail reforms to mobilize targeted 
individuals – specifically, organizational members. According to a meta-analysis of 52 large-
scale field experiments across different types of elections and messengers, a treatment explaining 
and endorsing the vote-by-mail process (easy, convenient, etc.) and providing a mail application 
for a ballot has consistently increased turnout by 0.83 percentage points (Mann, 2013). This 
sustained increase in turnout means a healthy widening of the pool of citizens participating in the 
democratic process as well as the benefits individuals gain from engaging in the voting process 
(Pateman, 1970). Based on this analysis, a similar vote-by-mail recruitment treatment in these 
experiments is expected to increase participation. The question is which treatment works best 





 For the partner organization, early voting and vote-by-mail recruitment were attractive 
because they not only offered an opportunity to determine if appeals to get members to utilize 
convenience voting reforms increased participation – but specifically – which appeal among 
commonly used tactics was most effective. Mass membership organizations continually refine 
the messaging of their mobilization tactics in order to maximize member political participation. 
The treatments both included a “Thank You for Voting” message and the subsequent text 
included either plan making elements that prompted the member to think about when and where 
they would cast their ballot, or return their mail ballot (e.g. Nickerson and Rogers, 2009; Rogers 
and Gerber, 2008) ,or the member’s past voting record (e.g. Mann, 2013; Davenport, 2009; 
Panagopoulos, 2009; Green, Gerber and Larimer, 2008; Gerber 2006). Both of these tactics have 
proven effective as social pressure methods. This research offers the opportunity to directly 
compare these tactics.  
 
Plan Making 
There is a robust amount of psychology literature indicating why plan making is an 
effective tactic for altering behavior and demonstrating how plan making is an effective way to 
encourage voting. Merely asking a person if they intend to engage in a certain behavior increases 
their likelihood of engaging (Nelson and Norton, 2005; Morwitz, Johnson and Schmittlein, 1993; 
Greenwald et al., 1987; Sherman, 1980). Its effectiveness is driven mainly by the increase in 
cognitive awareness and accessibility of the task because the intention is primed by the question 
(Morwitz and Fitzsimons, 2004). Guiding people on how to implement the when, where, and 
how of fulfilling their intentions increases their likelihood of following through for three reasons: 




making helps people to remember their intentions as well as engage pre-determined strategies for 
overcoming challenges they may face while acting on their intentions; and 3) plan making 
induces a sense of commitment to engage in the stated behavior (Gollwitzer, 1999). Encouraging 
people to make plans has increased follow-through on various behaviors—from committing to 
eat additional fruit each day (Armitage, 2007), getting more exercise (Prestwich et al., 2004), 
recycling (Holland et al., 2006), or dieting (Achtziger, 2008).  Prompting people to make plans 
insures a greater rate of success.  
Given the tactic’s prosperity in these varied arenas, it makes sense that plan making is 
also an effective way to encourage voter turnout. By prompting the voter to think through when 
they would vote, how they would get to their polling place, and where would they be coming 
from prior to voting, Nickerson and Rogers (2010) observed an increase of 4.1 percentage points 
compared to the control group. Additional analyses revealed that plan-making was particularly 
effective among citizens who did not already have a plan for how to get to their polling place. 
Thus, citizens who had never previously developed a voting plan were most responsive to the 
plan making intervention.  
Social Pressure 
Previous studies have examined the results of applying different amounts of social 
pressure in order to increase turnout. Social pressure is a chief principle of American politics. 
Interest groups, diplomats, legislators, and political organizations all utilize social pressure to 
push for an outcome in their favor. These social pressure methods borrow from social 
psychology research on shaming people into complying with certain behaviors. Preliminary 
research on shaming and voting was conducted in two pilot studies in which voters were 




that sharing an individual’s vote history as well as the vote history of their neighbors via mail 
increased turnout by 4.9 and 8.1 percentage points, respectively. Additionally, these social 
pressure mailers out performed mailers that included messaging about civic duty and mailers 
containing “Hawthorne Effect” language that included telling the recipient they were being 
studied to find out why people choose not to vote. The efficiency of these social pressure 
treatments is generated through the threat of social penalty for failing to vote since targets are 
now aware that their neighbors may know whether or not they voted. Additional voter 
mobilization experiments utilizing a person’s voting record have proven to be a consistent way to 
increase turnout (e.g. Mann, 2013; Davenport, 2009; Panagopoulos, 2009). However, social 
pressure is not foolproof.  Brehm and Brehm (1981) focused on a campaign to reduce littering 
and found that shaming failed to increased compliance and and instead decreased it. As Gerber, 
Green and Larimer (2008) point out, “the compliance-inducing effects of heavy-handedness are 
in tension, which makes the net effect of a shaming campaign an open empirical question” (p. 
35). This is, of course, a prime concern for the sponsoring organization of the communication 
whose last desire would be non-compliance and even worse backlash. 
Plan Making and Social Pressure Meet Convenience Voting 
Given the wealth of research in psychology and political science indicating the success of 
these two tactics, my partner organization sought to answer whether or not one method was 
superior to the other and whether or not these effects varied by vote method (voting by mail 
versus early voting). It is important to contextualize this prior research on plan-making and 
social pressure within the election in question. First, the experiment was conducted during a 
primary election where arguably fewer appeals were being made to voters by political or civic 




could feel confident that either of their interventions would be successful since they very well 
could be “the only game in town.”  Fewer citizens participate in primary elections so it is 
therefore reasonable to assume that many voters would not have a plan to vote in the primary, 
and the plan-making treatment would have spurred them to do so. Conversely, a social-pressure 
vote history treatment might also succeed in this environment as utilizing prior vote history as a 
social pressure mechanism has proved to be consistently successful since 2006. Another 
contextual element to consider is the amount of voting occurring in these states prior to Election 
Day and how vote method in prior elections might interact with the treatments themselves.  
Finally, it is worth considering how the plan-making treatment might function differently 
within the mail ballot chase experiment versus the voting early in-person experiment. For the 
ballot chase experiment, the plan-making treatment prompts the voter to think about when they 
will fill out their ballot, when they will return their ballot, and whether or not they will send their 
ballot back via mail or drop it off in-person. For the early voting experiment, the plan-making 
treatment prompts the voter to think about when they will be voting, what time of day they will 
vote early, and at which vote center they intend to early vote. This is of particular note in 
Arizona where the Permanent Early Vote List (PEVL) is comprised of voters who have absentee 
voted before and therefore may not need to make a plan to return their absentee ballot, but may 
be instead compelled by a social pressure treatment.  In terms of early voting, there are arguably 
additional plan-making elements to voting early in-person as opposed to sending in an absentee 
ballot. Voting early still requires the voter to know where and when they can vote. Furthermore, 
their early voting location may be different than that of their Election Day polling place and the 
hours during which a voter can cast a ballot may vary. Given these logistical hurdles, it may be 





These experiments were designed to evaluate the effectiveness of labor unions’ efforts to 
mobilize their members to participate in elections. Each hypothesis applies to both pre-Election 
Day turnout (either via VBM or EIPV) and overall turnout. I expect changes in how people vote 
and whether people vote. Additionally, provided the context in which this experiment is 
conducted, I also expect the treatments to behave differently within each experiment. Specially, I 
expect that the plan-making treatment will perform better for those mobilized to vote early in-
person while the social pressure treatment will perform better for those mobilized to vote by 
mail.   
My first hypothesis is based on prior experiments on convenience voting recruitment as a 
voter mobilization tactic: 
H1: A mailing and phone call encouraging use of voting by mail or voting early in person 
will increase the use of pre-Election Day voting methods (H1a) and overall turnout in the 
2014 primary election. 
 Support for the first hypothesis is a pre-requisite to investigating the hypothesis of central 
interest about the importance of mass membership organizations and their utilization of 
convenience voting reforms. The second hypothesis states the treatment effect is conditional on 
which convenience voting reform the member was encouraged to utilize, specifically: 
H2: The Plan-making treatment will perform better within the EIPV mobilization 
experiment while the social pressure treatment will perform better within the ballot chase 





I collaborated with a national labor union to conduct parallel experiments mobilizing 
their members to either vote early or to vote by mail in Arizona and Florida during the 2014 
primary election8. The labor union selected Arizona and Florida because both states offer early 
voting and voting by mail without an excuse. In Florida and Arizona, voters must request a mail 
ballot prior to Election Day. However, Arizona maintains a list of absentee voters via a PEVL, 
and those voters who signed up to vote by mail in previous elections were automatically sent a 
mail ballot.  In addition, the organization utilized the late primary schedule in both states in order 
to determine which mailer language was most effective at mobilizing members to vote early, and 
by mail to utilize in the following November general election. In Arizona, early voting begins 26 
days before Election Day and absentee voting is available without an excuse. In Florida, early 
voting begins 10-15 days before Election Day and concludes three days before Election Day and 
offers no-excuse absentee voting. Of particular interest to the labor union was how effective 
treatments like these could be in Right-to-Work states where union membership is much lower 
than those states without Right to Work laws.9  Both Arizona and Florida have unionized 
workforce rates under the national average of 11.1 percent. In 2014, about seven percent of the 
workforces in Arizona and Florida were represented by a labor union (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2015).   
                                                 
8 Arizona utilizes a hybrid primary system. Unaffiliated voters may choose which party’s primary they vote in while 
voters registered with a party can only vote in that party’s primary. Florida utilizes a closed primary system. Only 
those voters registered with a party can vote in that party’s primary. 
9 According to the Legal Defense Foundation, “right to work laws prohibit union security agreements, or agreements 
between employers and labor unions, that govern the extent to which an established union can require employees' 
membership, payment of union dues, or fees as a condition of employment, either before or after hiring. (Baird, 




Two parallel experiments were conducted in Arizona and Florida. One was distinctly 
aimed at mobilizing members to vote early in-person in Arizona and Florida, and the other aimed 
to increase voting by mail by those members who received or requested a mail ballot in Arizona 
and Florida. I compared two treatments: 1) sending a letter which encouraged members to “make 
a plan” to vote early or return their mail ballot, and; 2) sending a letter which included the 
member’s vote history for the past four general elections acquired from the secretary of state. 
Both treatments included a “thank you for voting” message in the text and were followed up with 
a live phone call mirroring the text of the letters10. The “make a plan” treatment for early voting 
included questions encouraging the target to plan when they would cast their ballot, and included 
early voting locations specific to the county of the target. Those that were on PEVL in Arizona 
as well as those who had requested a mail ballot in Florida by the time of conception for the 
mailers were put in the population for the vote by mail experiment. Everyone else was placed in 
the early voting experiment. The “make a plan” treatment for mail ballots included similar plan-
making questions, but focused on when the target intended to fill out and return their mail ballot. 
The voting record treatment provided a summary of the target’s voting history from the state 
election office.  
The EIPV experimental population consists of 42,13111 registered voters who met the 
following conditions: 1) members of the organization; 2) residents of Arizona or Florida; 3) were 
not already signed up for permanent mail voter status or had not already requested a mail ballot 
as of the first week of August 2014. Members in the EIPV experiment were randomly assigned 
to three conditions: 1) a letter encouraging the member to “make a plan” to vote early which 
included early voting locations in the member’s county; 2) a letter including the member’s voting 
                                                 
10 Copies of the mailers and phone scripts can be found in the appendix.  




history in the past four general elections provided by the secretary of state; or 3) the control 
group, which received no contact from the membership organization about voter turnout in the 
2014 election. Both treatments were followed up by a live phone call12 that echoed the text of the 
mailers; the plan making treatment call prompted the target to think about when and where they 
would vote early, and the vote history treatment call referenced the letter summarizing the 
member’s vote history.  
The VBM experiment population consists of 12,047 registered voters who met the 
following conditions: 1) members of the organization; 2) residents of Arizona or Florida; 3) were 
already permanent absentee voters or had requested a mail ballot as of the first week of August 
2014. The treatments were acting as a mail ballot chase mechanism for those in this experiment. 
Those in the VBM experiment were assigned to the same three conditions as the EIPV 
experiment: 1) the plan making treatment, which prompted members to think about when and 
where they would fill out their ballot and when they planned to return their ballot; 2) the vote 
history letter, which included the member’s vote history from the past four general elections; or 
3) the control group, which received no contact from the membership organization. Again, both 
treatments were followed up by live phone calls matching the treatment letter the member was 
assigned.  
In both experiments, random assignment was done at the household level to prevent 
violating the non-interference assumption (Nickerson 2008; McConnell, Sinclair and Green 
2010). Since the electoral context of each state was fundamentally distinct, the random 
assignment was stratified by state to create parallel experiments. In addition, both experiments 
included blocking for drop-off voters (those members who cast a ballot in 2012 but not in 2010). 
                                                 
12 Unfortunately, disposition data from the phone calls were not made available by my partner organization so phone 




Table 1 in the appendix shows the randomly assigned groups in the EIPV Experiment with the 
anticipated balance across covariates: 14,040 households received the plan making letter and 
follow-up phone call, 14,060 households received the vote history letter and follow-up phone 
call, and 14,031 households were placed in the control group and received no contact. Table 2 
shows the randomly assigned groups in the VBM Experiment with the expected balance across 
the observable covariates: 4,031 households received the plan making letter and follow-up phone 
call, 3,998 households received the vote history letter and follow-up phone call, and 4,018 
households were placed in the control group and received no contact. Table S2 in the 
supplemental materials reports the results of a multinomial logistic regression of random 
assignment on observable covariates for the two experiments; furthermore, showing that the 
randomization worked as expected.  
The effect of the treatments is measured using publicly available individual voting 
records acquired from the Arizona and Florida Secretary of State’s Office after the 2014 Primary 
Election by Catalist LLC. The individual level data allowed us to measure the effects of each 
treatment on method of casting a ballot (mail, early or polling place) and overall turnout. 
Table 3 reports the mean rate of voting overall on Election Day, and prior to Election 
Day for the 2014 primary election in Arizona and Florida. Since Arizona does not decipher 
between ballots cast early in person or early by mail, pre-Election Day voting includes both 
EIPV and VBM. Random assignment was conducted at the household level. I utilized logistic 
regression analysis for my hypothesis testing, because it accounts for (potential) intra-household 
correlation in voting behavior by clustering the standard errors at the household level 
(Arceneaux, 2005; Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009). Clustered randomizations are often utilized 




either the treatment or control group insures a simpler process for cutting walk lists. 
Implementation becomes much easier as canvassers are not assigned specific households or 
individuals. This same theory of clustering the randomization for mail experiments occurs at the 
household level and accounts for the very real possibility of co-habitants of the same address 
opening the mail belonging to the other habitant (as well as other messy correlations in voting 
behavior of those sharing a household). I reported the change in average probability between the 
control and treatment groups based on these regression analyses. Additionally, I included 
supplemental analysis of the treatment effects on voters with varying levels of previous pre-
Election Day voting experience.  
Results 
Experiment 1: EIPV Mobilization  
Each experimental condition, as detailed in Table 4,  presents the mean rates of voting in 
both Arizona and Florida based on the population being mobilized to vote early. This means that 
they were sent a mail piece that encouraged them to vote early in-person and were provided 
information about early voting locations in their county. These rates are calculated from logistic 
regression to account for the clustering of standard errors in multi-member households. Table 4 
displays the change in probability from the treatments in a model without additional covariates. 
Table S3 in the supplemental materials section reports the logit coefficients and the results of a 
model including the set of covariates in Table 1 that are commonly associated with voter turnout. 
As expected from random assignment, the inclusion of the covariates does not alter the results.  
 As seen in Table 4, the vote history treatment increased turnout by 0.5 percentage points 
compared to the turnout rate of the control group of 9.1 percent (p=0.072). The plan-making 




However, the difference between the treatments is statistically indistinguishable (p=0.847). Here 
I observed evidence that communication from a mass organization encouraging members to 
utilize early voting is successful but no additional evidence showed that one treatment 
outperforms the other. Table 4 also reports the overall mean rate of voting as well as the overall 
mean rates of voting with each voting method. The vote method is characterized by either polling 
place voting occurring on Election Day or by pre-Election Day voting, which includes voting by 
mail and early in-person voting. For the vote method analysis, non-voters were included.  In 
terms of Election Day voting, both treatments have little effect on the rate of Election Day 
voting. Both coefficients are substantively and statistically insignificant. This is to be expected 
considering the treatments were both aimed at pre-Election Day voting recruitment. The third 
column of Table 4 reports the effect of the treatments on pre-Election Day voting, we observe 
that both treatments were effective at increasing pre-Election Day voting. The vote history 
treatment increased pre-Election Day voting by 0.6 percentage points (p=0.009) and the plan 
making treatment increased turnout by 0.7 percentage points. Yet, the difference between the 
treatments was statistically insignificant (p=0.608). The membership organization was successful 
at increasing turnout in the 2014 primary election by encouraging members to take advantage of 
early voting available in their states, and was also successful at pushing their members to utilize 
pre-Election Day convenience voting reforms.  While the impact is small, the trend of increased 
turnout is encouraging for organizations trying to increase member turnout in non-presidential 
elections.   
Experiment 2: VBM Mobilization 
Table 5 reports the mean rates of voting in both Arizona and Florida based on the 




the same process described above. In the case of the VBM population, both treatments increased 
turnout above the 31.1 percent turnout rate of the control group. The plan making treatment 
significantly increased turnout in those mobilized to return their mail ballot by 2.0 percentage 
points (p=0.027) and the vote history treatment increased turnout by 3.0 percentage points and 
was also statistically significant (p=0.002). However, the 1.0 percentage point increase between 
the treatments was statistically indistinguishable (p=0.178). Much like the EIPV experiment, I 
observed little effect of the treatments on Election Day voting (which is to be expected); both 
coefficients are negative but not substantively significant at -0.002 percentage points for the vote 
history treatment and -0.003 percentage points for the plan making treatment with p-values well 
outside the levels of statistical significance. For pre-Election Day voting, both treatments 
significantly impact the use of pre-Election Day voting methods. The vote history treatment 
increased pre-Election Day voting by 3.2 percentage points (p=0.001) and the plan making 
treatment increased pre-Election Day voting by 2.3 percentage points (p=0.011), the 0.9 
percentage point difference between the treatments is inconsequential (p=0.204)13. These 
communications offer another successful attempt by a mass membership organization to increase 
turnout as well as mobilize the members to the method of voting encouraged by the treatment.  
 
Heterogeneous Effects and Prior Early Voting  
I wanted to examine the possibility of heterogeneity in the treatment effects across groups 
with prior pre-Election Day voting experience. The content of the two treatment questions have 
the potential to affect various types of voters in different ways.  Given that one of the treatments 
asked voters to ‘make a plan,’ it is possible this type of treatment would not resonate with voters 
                                                 




who had experience voting prior to Election Day in past elections. Should this be the case, there 
is an expectation that the vote history treatment would be more impactful among frequent pre-
Election Day voters as they would already be comfortable with voting before Election Day (and 
would conceivably already have a plan). Conversely, if a voter had considerable experience 
voting prior to Election Day, it is also plausible that they could be more receptive to the 
treatment considering they have engaged in the process before. Therefore, I examined whether 
the average treatment effects varied across rates of pre-Election Day voting. 14 I divided the 
experimental population into categories based on past pre-Election Day voting to look for 
heterogeneous treatment effects.15  This analysis was conducted for both the EIPV and VBM 
experimental population.16  
 Figure 3 shows the average treatment effects on turnout (and 95% confidence intervals) 
for those in the EIPV Experiment within each pre-Election Day voting category. There is some 
support for the hypothesis that the ‘make a plan’ would be less effective among those individuals 
with greater pre-Election Day voting experience. For those who have voted prior to Election Day 
in one of four previous general elections, the plan-making treatment effect is near statistical 
significance (p=0.068; one-tailed) while the vote history treatment is not (p=0.493). Conversely, 
for those who have voted prior to Election Day in two of four previous general elections, the vote 
history treatment significantly impacts turnout at conventional levels (p=0.001) while the plan-
making treatment does not have an effect on turnout (p=0.279). While there does seem to be 
                                                 
14 For this analysis I did not distinguish between voting by mail prior to Election Day and voting in-person prior to 
Election Day. Since Arizona does not distinguish between these two methods on their voter file, I group both voters 
with previous experience of voting by mail and voting early in-person together under the “Pre-Election Day Voter” 
category. 
15 The groups were defined by having voted prior to Election Day in one of four previous general elections, two of 
four previous general elections, three of four previous general elections, and four of four previous general elections. 
Those elections are 2012, 2010, 2008, and 2006.     




some support for the expectation that the make a plan treatment may underperform with frequent 
pre-Election Day voters, neither treatment makes a significant impact on three of four or four of 













       
  Figure 4 shows the average treatment effects on turnout (and 95% confidence intervals) 
for those in the VBM Experiment within each pre-Election Day voting category. The only 
significant impact on turnout was among voters who had voted prior to Election Day in two of 
the previous four general elections. Both the vote history and plan-making treatments had a 
similar significant impact (p=0.046 and p=0.011, respectively) but not significant difference 
between the two. Both treatments approach statistical significance for one of four and three of 




















































Figure 3: Heterogeneity by Previous Early Voting
Treatment Effects on Overall Turnout in EIPV Experiment




there does not seem to be an indication that the plan-making treatment underperformed with 











Discussion and Conclusion 
In a field experiment first of its kind, a national labor union was able to test two standing 
GOTV best practices against one another to determine not only whether or not their intervention 
was effective, but which intervention was more impactful. The results from two voter 
mobilization field experiments among labor union members in Arizona and Florida during the 
2014 primary election support the expectations that membership organizations enhance voter 



















































Figure 4: Heterogeneity by Previous Early Voting
Treatment Effects on Overall Turnout in VBM Experiment




swaths of the workforce are not unionized. Furthermore, the results from these experiments also 
support the expectation that EIPV and VBM recruitment consistently increase voter turnout.   
If voter turnout trends continue on their current path, it will become absolutely critical for 
membership organizations, civic groups, and political parties to find a way to engage the 
electorate. The path forward may be forged by convenience voting reforms but organizations will 
still have to take on the important task of informing members that these opportunities exist. 
Evidence from this experiment indicates that mobilizing members to take advantage of these 
reforms by either casting a ballot before Election Day in person or voting by mail is a successful 
way to increase turnout in a primary election. 
As more states offer voters multiple ways to cast ballots, organizations and groups in 
those states will have to find ways to best mobilize their members. The landscape of ballot 
casting is constantly evolving, and thus the tactics of how to mobilize voters within the landscape 
must also evolve. This research offered an opportunity to do just that: to examine two 
consistently utilized methods of GOTV social pressure and determine which was most effective 
at increasing turnout of the targeted electorate. Unfortunately, the results are not exactly tidy, but 
there does seem to be evidence that utilizing a voter’s previous vote history is more effective 
than asking the voter to make a plan to cast a ballot (whether that be early or by mail). 
Additionally, as more and more states offer voting by mail without an excuse, and a higher 
proportion of the electorate receives a ballot – mail ballot chase campaigns will become an 
important element of campaign strategy among interested parties. In the case of the VBM 
Experiment, there is a strong indication that mass membership organizations can increase turnout 
among their members by chasing ballots and slight indication that the best way to accomplish 




organization fear backlash from invoking social pressure via a member or voter’s previous vote 
history, this research indicates that plan-making treatments are a viable (and perhaps a more 
palatable) option (especially in the case of early in-person voting). 
It is also worth discussing the implications of this research for organizations like labor 
unions who benefit from recruiting members to use convenience voting reforms. Knowing which 
messages motivate their members to cast a ballot prior to Election Day is critical for a number of 
reasons. First, there is strong evidence that convenience voting not only increases turnout in the 
election in question, but also subsequent elections (Mann, 2013; Mann and Mayhew, 2013). 
Second, if labor unions know they can successfully push their members to vote prior to Election 
Day, this allows them to “bank” votes. Further letting them better predict election results prior to 
Election Day (particularly in union-dense areas) based on publicly available early vote data, and 
to allocate their resources more efficiently. Finally, the results of this research have large 
implications for resource allocation. Voter turnout programs are costly for membership 
organizations.  Knowing that members can be mobilized by a certain message or medium is 
critical for labor unions. In the case of these experiments, a letter and a phone call, methods far 
less expensive than canvassing or television ads, successfully mobilized members.          
As with any field experiment, replication across various electoral environments is 
necessary to insure the external validity of findings. Additionally, more research that marries the 
role of mass organizations in member participation and the availability of convenience voting 
reforms as a mobilization strategy is necessary to further best practices and research around large 















CALL ME MAYBE?  VARYING PATCH-THROUGH SCRIPTS TO OPTIMIZE 
AVOCACY PROGRAMS 
 
“I would say that about 40 percent of our off-year live programs are patch [through] 
programs, it’s a much lower portion of our on-years (about 15 percent).  What we have 
seen is a shift from very large national efforts to a lot more state-based work. Our fights 
are mostly reactive; opposing the Trans Pacific Partnership or asking voters to stand with 
Planned Parenthood.” 
 
-Marty Stone, Partner at Stones’ Phones 
 
Introduction 
Labor unions employ a host of different tactics to increase the power of various member 
advocacy programs. One of those tactics is known as patch-through calls, where either a live or 
automated message is delivered to a constituent. The message urges the person to “take action” 
on an issue by pressing one to be connected to a targeted elected official’s office. The 
organization often encourages the constituent to convey approval or disapproval of a legislator’s 
actions, whether it be supporting or opposing a bill, making controversial statements, or inaction 
on a cause important to the organization in question.  
Labor unions are not the only political players utilizing patch-through programs to drive 
legislator action. Jennifer Matthews, a partner at AMM Strategies (a telephone strategy firm 
whom consults with Democratic candidates and progressive coalitions), notes that she has 
worked on several campaigns in which patch-through calls changed the outcome of the 
campaign.  Matthews states, “In 2016, we worked with a statewide organization in Colorado to 
defeat Senate Bill 238.  [The] bill would allow any business to ignore Colorado’s 
nondiscrimination laws and claim that their religion is the reason why.” (Matthews 2017) In 




voters to call for the resignation of State Senator Frank Artiles, a Republican from the Miami 
area who had reportedly used a racial slur in reference to a group of black legislators. Senator 
Artiles resigned on Friday, April 21st 2017.      
 The union’s appeals to their members to take action are not without challenges. Between 
declining approval ratings (Gallup, 2014), declining membership rates (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2016), and an increase in Right-to-Work laws, labor unions have their hands full. 
When focusing specifically on phone-based mobilization efforts by unions, general phone 
contact and cooperation rates have declined tremendously over the past decade from 90 to 62 
percent and 43 to 14 percent, respectively (AAPOR, 2012).  Additionally, getting the member or 
target to stay on the phone long enough to hear the call to action is critical to insuring the 
campaign’s success. As such, phone script optimization becomes essential for unions and 
organizations. This experiment aims to do just that: not only measure whether appeals to union 
members increases their advocacy but which type of appeal is most effective. 
 Given the hurdles faced by labor unions and other organizations in motivating their 
members to contact legislators, it begs the question: Why even bother? The short answer is:  It 
works. As Fenno (1977) states, “The constituency that a representative reacts to is the 
constituency that he or she sees.” (p. 883) Representatives normally try to act in-step with their 
constituent’s wishes (Fowler and Shaiko, 1987; Goldstein, 1999; Kingdon, 1989; Kollman, 1998; 
Lee, 2002) and depend rather crucially on constituent communication as they make decisions 
(Kingdon, 1989; Bergan, 2009; Miller, 2010; Bergan and Cole, 2014). In cases where a 
legislator’s vote can directly influence an individual’s working conditions, salary, pensions, etc. 
(as is the case for labor union members) members can be motivated to take the action needed to 




This research aims to marry advocacy experimental research and the roll of group 
membership, specifically labor unions, on political participation. This advocacy experiment 
builds on previous research in two important ways: 1) It offers the perspective of a labor union 
within advocacy research; and 2) Builds on previous patch-through experiments to determine 
what phone script best optimizes patch-through campaigns. In the eyes of labor unions it is 
paramount to find additional ways to encourage political participation among their membership. 
This research offers insights on that front. 
This chapter proceeds in the following manner.  First, I briefly review how group 
membership affects political participation (and how labor unions specifically boost the political 
participation of their members). Next, I cover previously conducted advocacy experiments. Then 
I describe the design of my field experiment conducted in partnership with a statewide labor 
union. Third, I present the results of the field experiment. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of 
the results and their implications within the research of advocacy experiments and mass 
membership organizations. I found that there are no statistical differences of patch-through rates 
across treatment conditions. In examining the race of union members and legislators included in 
the experiment, I found that union members of color were more likely to patch-through to 
legislators of color. Although there are some substantive differences between the treatments 
among white union members and union members of color, I did not detect any differences across 
treatments among the varying racial groups (though admittedly this may be due to a lack of 
statistical power).  
Group Membership and Political Participation 
Scholars have long maintained that membership in a mass organization significantly 




Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960; Miller et al., 1981; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Radcliff 
and Davis 2000; Beck et al. 2008). Additional research indicates that membership in mass 
organizations increases participation indirectly: members foster leadership and participation 
skills and then utilize those skills in a political context (Verba et al., 1995; Leighey, 1996). 
Members of a group are more likely to be exposed to a more politically active social network, 
which in turn increases their likelihood to participate due to social norms and social rewards and 
sanctions (Fowler, 2005; Klofstad, 2010; Sinclair, 2012). Given all of the contributing factors of 
mass membership organizations, organizations are a major determinant of political participation.  
Leighey and Nagler (2007) find membership organizations have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on individual voter turnout through two mechanisms: being an 
organization member and residing in a state with a higher group membership. Mass 
organizations increase participation among their members, and also non-group members 
(although at lower rates). They estimate that if union membership levels remained as they were 
in 1964, overall turnout would have been approximately 4.9 percentage points higher in 2004 (p. 
436). While they do not provide a specific point estimate for non-union members, they do note, 
“individuals living in states with stronger unions are more likely to vote, and this is true 
controlling for other aspects of campaign mobilization and demographic characteristics.” 
Much of the literature on mass membership organizations focuses on labor unions. Union 
members can be difficult to mobilize since their decisions to join a union are often driven by 
employment decisions and not political ones (as opposed to individuals that may self-select into 
organizations or political parties). Additionally, many union members come from working-class 
backgrounds and may lack some of the basic knowledge to politically participate. Much like 




participation. Kerrissey and Schofer (2013) indicate that labor unions utilize three noteworthy 
processes to spur political action of their members: 1) labor unions cultivate organizational and 
civic skills of their members as a way to achieve organizational and political goals (Markowitze, 
1998; Clawson, 2003; Sharpe, 2004); 2) unions shape the political identity of their members by 
encouraging collective acts (Fantasia, 1989; Weinbaun, 2004; Nissen, 2010); and 3) unions 
directly mobilize their members (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Asher et al., 2001; Meyer, 
2007).  
Previous studies of unions and political participation frequently focus on the outcomes of 
elections. At the aggregate level, voter turnout and union density are correlated (Radcliff and 
Davis, 2000; Radcliff ,2001). Individual-level research shows that union members often support 
Democratic candidates (Sousa, 1993; Juravich and Shergold, 1988; Asher et al., 2001) and are 
much more likely to vote than nonunion citizens (Masters and Delaney, 1986; Freeman, 2003; 
Leighley and Nagley 2007; Rosenfeld 2010).  
 Utilizing analysis of multiple publically-available datasets, Kerrissey and Schofer (2013) 
find “The effect of union membership is broad, spanning most types of political and civic 
involvement, including voting, protesting, signing petitions, association membership and so on” 
(p. 919). These effects are strongest among those with low levels of education. Unions provide 
training and mobilizing efforts tailored specifically to boost participation among low-education 
voters. Additionally, Harrison (2004) found that unions affect members differently and that 
unions have a higher importance in the structural life of men, African Americans, and the 
working class. Essentially, labor unions can close the participation gap for voters who, without 





Constituency Communication, Advocacy, And Field Experiments 
There have been a handful of experiments conducted to determine whether or not 
constituent opinions matter. Butler and Nickerson (2011) surveyed over 10 thousand New 
Mexicans across the 70 State House districts on various budget proposals. District specific 
results were sent to a randomly selected half of the legislature. Legislators receiving their district 
specific survey results were much more likely to vote in line with constituent opinion than those 
who did not. Their results support a long-line of observationally based research indicating that 
constituent opinion matters and can affect legislator behavior.  
Additional research focusing on who is likely to contact their elected officials found that 
voters were more willing to contact their legislators of their same race (Broockman, 2014) and of 
their same political party (Broockman and Ryan, 2014). Michelson and Bedolla (2014), found 
that nativity and national origin often drive why certain individuals are mobilized to participate 
in the political process. Broockman and Ryan (2014) utilized observational, field experimental, 
and natural experimental approaches to find that 25 percent of respondents reported a preference 
for contacting a co-partisan while seven percent reported a preference for contacting the out 
partisan (p. 1097). Brookman (2014) argues that this leads to politicians receiving 
communication from constituents of their racial group more often than other racial groups. 
However, “this phenomenon might explain the pattern that American minorities on the whole 
communicate to their representatives much less often than whites, even though both groups 
appear to communicate to co-racial representatives at similar rates” (p. 308).  
 In specifically focusing on the impact of patch-through calls, Bergan and Cole (2013) 
randomized how many calls a representative received regarding anti-bullying legislation.  They  




percentage points (p. 12). Academics are not the only people conducting this research, as higher 
constituent communication is a common goal across various organizations.  In 2013 TakeAction 
Minnesota17 conducted a patch-through experiment on a budget bill in the state legislature. 
Targets randomly received one of three messages: 1) A baseline message which contained a call 
to action; 2) The baseline message and an internal efficacy message (i.e. “scientific studies have 
shown calls from constituents work!”; or 3) The baseline message and an external threat 
message, which referenced opponents of the tax plan (i.e. “corporate lobbyists”). The group 
found that the external threat message was effective at increasing the patch-through rate over the 
baseline message but that the internal efficacy message actually produced a lower patch-through 
rate than the baseline message (Analyst Institute , 2013)18. A patch-through experiment 
conducted by a national labor union aimed to determine whether the effectiveness of patch-
through robocalls19 to priority Senators could be optimized by script language. Targets were 
randomly assigned to receive one of three scripts urging them to call their senator: 1) a baseline 
script; 2) an urgency message that stressed immediate action; or 3) an activist identity message 
stressing that “activists like them” should call their senator. The best performing message was 
the urgency message, which increased the rate of patch-throughs by 1.4 percentage points over 
the baseline control message and the activist identity message (p<0.001); the urgency script 
preformed best not only in the non-targeted states but in the targeted states as well (Analyst 
Institute, 2013). 
                                                 
17 TakeAction Minnesota is, “a statewide network of people – people just like you — working to realize racial and 
economic equity across Minnesota.” (http://www.takeactionminnesota.org/about-us/)  
18 The Analyst Institute is, “A clearinghouse for evidence on voter contact and engagement programs, we collect, 
synthesize, and interpret research in order to make evidence-based recommendations to the progressive community 
through materials, trainings, and consulting.” (https://analystinstitute.org/our-mission/) 
19 Robocalls refer to phone calls delivered by a pre-recorded automated message. They are also referred to as IVR 




 This research focuses very specifically on one element of advocacy experiments with a 
unique bend toward mass membership organizations and how they engage and mobilize their 
members. While other research has focused on who is mobilized to contact their legislators, or 
whether or not contacting legislators changes their behavior, this experiment emphasizes what to 
say in order to maximize contact of legislators by constituents. The results of this research have 
implications for both the academic study of political participation in the United States as well as 
the practical implementation of engagement efforts conducted by various organizations. From a 
practical perspective, knowing what to say in order to generate the greatest number of patch-
throughs can directly lead to the adoption or defeat of legislation that could help or hurt an 
organization. Additionally, as organizations such as labor unions face dwindling resources to 
communicate with their members, optimizing the communication for cost savings is critical. 
Using the patch-through experiment conducted by a national labor union as an example, 
researchers determined that if everyone was called with the winning message an additional 584 
patches would have been generated (compared to the baseline message) thus reducing the cost 
per patch-through to $8.50 per complete from $11.26 per complete (Analyst Institute , 2013). In 
a political environment with shrinking resources and increasing phone costs for membership 
organizations, the optimization of communication becomes critical. So, while this research 




I collaborated with a statewide labor union who wished to determine what script language 




representative. The goal of the patch-through program was to encourage state assembly members 
to stand against a piece of legislation proposed by the state’s governor. Members in 16 assembly 
districts20 were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 1) a baseline script based on 
previous patch-through scripts urging the member to contact their representative (12,339 
members); 2) a baseline script that also included urgent language encouraging members to act 
“immediately” or “right away” and contact their legislator (12,338 members); 3) a baseline script 
that also included activist identity language encouraging “activists like them” to contact their 
legislator (12,339 members); or 4) a baseline script that also included language emphasizing the 
“ease of making your voice heard” on an important issue and that contacting their legislator 
would be “quick and easy” (12,339 members). I worked with the partner organization on the 
development and production of the treatment and then worked with the organization’s phone 
vendor to ensure proper data collection21. 
 The experimental population consisted of 49,355 union members who met the following 
two conditions: those had an available landline phone number and resided in one of the 16 
targeted state assembly districts. These members were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions described above. When the target opted to patch-through to their representative’s 
office, the phone vendor who conducted the calls recorded this. This disposition data was 
provided to my partner organization 48 hours after the completion of the campaign.   
All of the calls were conducted via live phone call. The list was generated from the labor 
union’s full membership file, but limited to the districts in which there were targeted legislators. 
The sector of my partner organization is predominantly female, which is why a majority of those 
                                                 
20 Descriptive statistics of the State Assembly districts can be found in Table S9 in the Supplemental Materials. 
21 Fortunately, my partner organization did not have any strong objections to any of the scripts I proposed and was 




in the targeted universe are female. My partner organization wished to target Democratic state 
assembly members and ask them to stand in opposition to legislation proposed by the state’s 
governor. Randomization was done at the household level to prevent violating the non-
interference assumption (Nickerson, 2008; McConnell, Sinclair and Green, 2010). In the rare 
instance a household contained two union members, a target was randomly selected within the 
household. Table 6 shows the randomly assigned groups in the experiment with the expected 
balance across observable covariates. Table 7 reports the results of a multinomial logistic 
regression of random assignment on observable covariates for the experiment. An interactive 
voice recording (IVR) screen was conducted prior to the calls beginning to ensure the list only 
included working phone numbers. Cell phones were excluded as the Federal Communication 
Commission (FCC) bans the predictive dialing of cell phones.22  The program lasted four days as 
the organization wanted to apply pressure to the elected officials around the time of voting on the 
measure. Full scripts are included in the Appendix.      
 As noted in the Appendix, the control group received a script that is based on the partner 
group’s boilerplate language utilized in previous patch-through efforts. While not a ‘no-contact,’ 
pure control group, this design is still equipped to measure the meaningful differences between 
the treatments and the control group. In this case, I am not trying to make an argument for 
varying the script language versus no language at all, but that varying the language compared to 
a standard template is a worthwhile endeavor and increases patch-through rates. As Morton and 
Williams (2006) point out, “the aspect of control that is most important is not the fact that the 
researcher has a comparison, but that the researcher can control confounding variables in order to 
                                                 
22 While contact to cell phones typically yields higher response rates, the FCC ban means cell phones must be hand 




make the comparison meaningful.”23 Moreover, as Gerber and Green (2002) argue, the 
relationship between political scientists and political actors benefits from interaction; and while 
in service of adding to the academic research on advocacy mobilization, this work seeks to 
answer a very practical political question of whether or not this specific intervention is 
worthwhile. 
 The partner organization’s selection parameters raise the question of external validity. 
Admittedly, the results from all field experiments are specific to the context in which they are 
conducted, including this experiment. Since these experiments were conducted in partnership 
with a large membership organization and sought to answer a pragmatic as well as theoretical 
question, the experiments have a high degree of realism on Gerber and Green’s four criteria for 
“an ideal field experiment”: “(1) whether the treatment used in the study resembles the 
intervention of interest in the world, (2) whether the participants resemble the actors who 
ordinarily encounter these interventions, (3) whether the context within which subjects receive 
the treatment resembles the context of interest, and (4) whether the outcome measures resemble 
the actual outcomes of theoretical or practical interest” (Gerber & Green, 2011, Chapter 2). 
While the partner organization did selectively target within their overall membership, this 
selectivity reflects normal and typical practices by political elites (and specifically by our partner 
organization). The results may not be generalizable to all members of all organizations, but they 
represent the actual activity of mass membership organizations and thus provide valuable 
insights about my research question. 
                                                 





 For the analyses, I excluded subjects who never picked up the phone or who hung up the 
phone within seconds of answering. This is in line with previous patch through experiments (i.e. 
Broockman 2014). The treatment was never administered to these subjects because they never 
heard the script and its subsequent variations. This meant that 4,487 subjects received the full 
treatment. There was an effort made by the vendor to ensure that targets were not patched 
through to a busy line at their legislator’s office. However, this is often times unavoidable as 
multiple operators are patching targets through to the same office. During this campaign, 4.6 
percent of live answers were patched through to a busy signal (0.2 percent of the whole targeted 
universe). These targets were then reconnected with the operator and provided their legislator’s 
office phone number so they could call back at a later time. I included these cases as part of those 
that are considered “successful” patches. The justification is that because the target receiving the 
script was motivated to press one and contact their legislator, the treatment was deemed 
successful in generating a patch-through. The effect of the treatments is measured using the call 
disposition data provided by the vendor conducting the phone calls. I reported the change in 
average probability between the baseline and treatment groups based on these regression 
analyses. The following section covers the results overall as well as building on research from 
Broockman (2014).  I examine the effects of legislator and member race on patch through rates 
to see if the trends he observed for constituents are replicated among union members.  
Results 
Overall 
For each experimental condition, Table 8 presents the mean rates of patch-throughs of union 
members to their legislators and displays the change in probability from the treatments in a 




logit coefficients and the results of a model including the set of covariates in Table 6 that are 
commonly associated with political participation. As expected from random assignment, the 
inclusion of the covariates does not alter the results. 
 As seen in Column 1 through Column 3 in Table 8, none of the treatment conditions 
significantly increases the rate of patch-throughs compared to the baseline script. In fact, 
contrary to previous research, the urgency script performs the worst among the four scripts. The 
patch through rate of those receiving the baseline script was 37.0 percent, while the patch 
through rate of those receiving the urgency script was only 35.4. However, the difference 
between the patch through rates is not statistically insignificant (p=0.795, two-tailed). In 
examining the differences between the identity and baseline script, the identity script increased 
the patch-through rate over the baseline script by .4 percentage points though that increase is also 
not statistically significant (p=0.430). Finally, in comparing the ease script to the baseline script 
we see that the baseline script outperforms the ease script but only by .3 percentage points and 
that difference is not statistically significant (p=0.575).  
 Columns 4 through Column 6 report the comparison between treatments to see if there 
are any differences between treatments. Column 4 reports the difference between the urgency 
and identity scripts. The mean patch-through rate of those who received the identity script was 
37.4 percent and the mean patch-through rate of those who received the urgency script was 35.4 
percent. The two percentage point difference between the two treatments is close to statistical 
significance (p=0.161, two-tailed). However, the additional comparisons do not yield anything of 
note, as the differences between the urgency and ease messages are both statistically and 
substantively insignificant. The same is true of the comparison between the identity and ease 




Results by Constituent and Legislator Race 
Building on research conducted by Broockman (2014), I examine if there were any 
differences between the patch-through rates of white union members and union members of 
color to legislators of various races.24  To accomplish this, I compare the average patch through 
rates to white legislators and legislators of color based25 on the union member’s race across all 
16 targeted districts. For the voter’s races, I utilized commercially available data from Catalist 
LLC26 and coded the members’ races as either white or other.27 
 Table 9 reports the mean patch-through rate of white union member and union members 
of color. Column 1 reports the mean rate of patch-throughs of white and union members of color 
to white legislators. The average patch-through rate of union members of color to white 
legislators was 36.8 percent while the patch-through rate of white union members to white 
legislators was 36.2 percent. The difference of the patch-through rates of the groups is .6 
percentage points and is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p=0.384). Column 2 
reports the mean patch-through rate of white union members and union members of color to 
legislators of color. The rate of patch-throughs to legislators of color by white union members 
was 33.4 percent while the rate of patch-throughs of union members of color to legislators of 
color was 38 percent.  The difference in patch-through rate of 4.6 percentage points is 
                                                 
24 I would have also presented results of analyses on the differences in patch-through rates based by political party, 
however, there wasn’t enough diversity within the sample to conduct co-party analysis. The targeted legislators were 
all Democrats and over 90 percent of the experimental sample were registered Democrats. 
25 I concede that this coding of a legislator’s race is a rather blunt instrument. It was done utilizing information from 
legislator biographies, websites and other publicly available data. I am confident that the classification of legislator 
of color is appropriate given the data available.  
26 This data was included in the original file provided by my partner organization and was included as part of the 
random assignment to treatment. 
27 Admittedly, this is a blunt classification as Latino and African American voters and legislators will be grouped 




statistically significant at conventional levels (p=0.060)28. While examining rates of legislator 
communication was not the primary research goal of this project, I observed at least some 
support of the hypothesis that a constituent’s race impacts their likelihood to contact a legislator 
belonging to the same racial group. And although not statistically significant, it is worth noting 
that union members of color contacted their legislator at a higher rate, regardless of the 
legislator’s race. 
 Beyond confirming the observational differences in patch-through rates of same race 
groups discovered in previous research, I also wanted to examine the effects of co-racial union 
members and legislators to determine if there was a difference across treatments (despite a lack 
of statistical power) 29. Table 10 reports the difference in mean patch through rates of white 
union members to white legislators by assignment. Compared to the baseline script, only the 
identity script increased the patch-through rate of white union members to white legislators. This 
increase over the baseline rate of 37.2 percent was .6 percentage points but is not statistically 
significant (p=0.429). The baseline script outperformed both the urgency and ease scripts, by 1.2 
and 3.5 percentage points, respectively. However, again neither of these differences are 
statistically significant. Columns 4, 5, and 6 report the mean patch through rates comparing the 
urgency versus identity script, the urgency versus ease script, and the identity versus ease script. 
The only comparison that remotely approaches statistical significance is Column 4 where the 
identity script out performs the urgency script by 1.7 percentage points (p=0.284).  
                                                 
28 Additionally, I examined the difference in patch-through rates of white union members to white legislators (36.2 
percent) and legislators of color (33.4 percent) but found that there was no statistically significant difference 
between the patch-through rates (p=0.838). 
29 There were approximately 1,000 observations included in the white union member and white legislator analysis 




 Table 11 reports the difference in average patch-through rate of union members of color 
to legislators of color by assignment. As reported by column 1, 2, and 3, the baseline script 
outperformed the urgency, identity, and ease scripts. The baseline script patch-through rate was 
38.4 percent while the patch-through rate for those receiving the urgency script was 37.7 points, 
the rate for those receiving the identity script was 37.5 percent, and the rate for those receiving 
the ease script was 38.3 percent. The differences between the baseline and other scripts are not 
statistically significant. As in the previous table, columns 4, 5, and 6 report the comparison 
between the various scripts.  Similar to the rates of patch-through of white union members and 
white legislators, none of these comparisons are statistically significant. Sadly, this additional 
analysis to determine what kind of language leads to higher patch-through rates of co-racial 
groups was unfruitful, yet certainly worthy of further investigation.    
Discussion 
 The results from this experiment indicate varying phone script language does not appear 
to generate higher rates of legislator contact via patch-through calls. Unlike prior research, 
varying patch-through script language, utilizing words that convey a sense of urgency did not 
increase the patch-through rate of those union members receiving the urgency treatment. 
Additionally, scripts including language around activist identity or language conveying the ease 
of contacting their legislator had no impact on the patch-through rates of the union members that 
received those treatments. These results are certainly disappointing as unions are consistently 
attempting to spur political action among their members. However, from a programmatic 
perspective, knowing that a baseline script performs at the same rate as other altered language is 




 There are a number of reasons that the varied patch-through scripts might have failed. For 
one, this was a very specific issue up for deliberation within the state assembly, so it is possible 
these union members were unaware of its existence. Therefore, stressing the urgency, their 
activist identity, or ease of the making their voice heard on the issue was not effective. Although 
each script attempted to provide some background on the issue, the scripts may have not cleared 
the first barrier to entry of knowledge on the issue. Even though the variations between scripts 
failed to yield significance, an almost 40 percent patch through rate did satisfy the organization, 
especially as the desired outcome around the legislative issue was achieved. However, given the 
limited amount of research on the optimization of patch-through calls, every field experiment 
offers an opportunity to expand the realm of research. As such, it is unlikely that every attempt 
will be successful.  
 In examining patch through rates based on union member and legislator race, I found that 
union members of color are more likely to communicate with legislators of color. This 
complements previous research on constituent communication and race. Union members of color 
were slightly more likely to communicate with their legislator regardless of race, although that 
slight difference in contact rate is not statistically significant. Given that people of color engage 
with their representatives at a much lower rate compared to their white counterparts, there may 
be some evidence that this communication by the labor union is spurring political action among 
groups that feel disenfranchised by the political process. This also complements previous 
research, which stipulates that membership to group, specifically labor unions, can lower the 
barriers to participation and broaden the pool of who is politically engaged. Unfortunately, a 
further investigation to determine if there were differences across script type did not reveal 




knowing what language spurs greater participation among these subgroups is worthy of 
additional research.  
As with any field experiment, replication across various environments is necessary to 
insure the external validity of findings. In the realm of field experiments, there is still a lot to 
learn about communication optimization tailored toward political acts other than voting. Further 
testing should be conducted to determine what types of language increase constituent 
communication with their legislators. This future research should also examine modes of 
communication beyond just live phone calls.  Additionally, more research marrying the role of 
mass organizations in member participation and advocacy experiments can help to answer the 







DON’T KNOCK LABOR UNIONS:  EXAMINING OUTCOMES FROM TWO DOOR-
TO-DOOR CANVASSING EXPERIMENTS  
 
 
“Every additional vote you get out could be the difference between us winning and losing. And I 
gotta tell you, we are behind.” 
 
-Richard Trumka, AFL-CIO President, November 2014 
 
 
“As effective as high quality field campaigns are today, they’re likelier to get even better as the 
research improves. Successful turnout interventions also seem to have lasting impacts on 
individuals, leading them to become lifelong voters, as well as on their cohabitants. But to take 
advantage of these innovations, campaigns need to seriously increase their focus on field.” 
 
-David Brookman and Joshua Kalla; Vox Media, November 2014 
 
Introduction 
Amid the unique characteristics of the United States is the prolific nature in which 
elections occur in a given calendar year. However, few voters cast their ballots in as many 
contests as they are able to, especially when their ballot lacks a presidential candidate (and 
subsequent fanfare). Over the last few cycles voter turnout in the United States has hovered 
around 60 percent of the voting eligible population during presidential election years while for 
decades turnout has only reached about 40 percent during midterm elections. More details on 




                                                 















Figure 5 not only outlines that overall turnout has decreased for both Presidential and 
midterm elections, but that midterm turnout does not remotely approach the levels of turnout 
observed in presidential years. Even further disheartening is the nosedive turnout takes in odd 
year primary and local elections where as little as one-fifth of the electorate votes (Morlan, 1984; 
Gerber and Nickerson, 2003). This is particularly concerning because local elections arguably 
contain more consequential offices and ballot measures that directly impact voter’s day-to-day 
lives. As a report from the Knight Foundation explains, “Local elections determine how 
neighborhoods look and feel, whether and how streets are kept clean and safe, how roads and 
transit work, what it’s like to have a job, start a business and have kids in the places we live” 
(The Knight Foundation, 2015). Hajnal and Troustine (2005) also note the importance of local 
contests: 
While presidential and Congressional elections get much of our attention, they are 




emerge from local contests and more votes are cast in the multitude of local 
elections than in national contests. In short, it matters who wins and who loses in 
a political arena that touches regularly on the lives of residents. (p. 531) 
 Many of the socioeconomic and demographic factors contributing to a person’s 
likelihood to vote in a presidential or statewide election also contributes to a person’s likelihood 
to vote in a local election (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).  Even though the participation gap for local elections can be 
exacerbated in several ways.  One of the contributing factors to the decline in local elections is 
media coverage. A 2014 study conducted by Danny Hayes and Jennifer Lawless found that a 
diminished news environment depresses citizen engagement. This is especially noteworthy given 
the cutbacks to local and state journalism, voters have less information on the candidates and 
ballot measures in a given election and are thus less likely to vote (Hayes & Lawless, 2014). 
Other factors noted in Portland State’s research project Who Votes for Mayor noted that turnout 
varied dramatically among neighborhoods. Many residents live in voting “deserts,” areas where 
turnout in their neighborhood is half (or less) than the citywide average (Portland State 
University , 2016). This means that a small portion of each city determines who represents 
everybody. The consequences of this are hard to understate.    
One of the unfortunate outcomes of stymied turnout in local elections is that minority 
candidates and minority voters often times fail to win. Low levels of voter participation from 
African Americans, Latinos and Asian Americans leads to systematic underrepresentation on 
local governing bodies. Minority representation has consequences for both improving racial and 
ethnic relations and the distribution of public goods in cities.  As explained by Hajnal and 




turnout. As more and more policies are both initiated and implemented at the local level and as 
the problems of many urban areas become more acute, the decisions that local voters make are 
taking on growing importance.” (p.531) 
All of these factors contributing to the electoral environments of local elections are not 
lost on groups like labor unions who have a vested interest in the political mobilization of their 
members especially as it might relate to a specific elected office or ballot measure. State and 
local policies directly affect labor unions abilities to collectively bargain, so their attention to 
these races is paramount to their survival. Given that levels of turnout in these elections vacillate 
between one-fifth and one-half of the registered electorate (Green, Gerber and Nickerson, 2003), 
labor unions (as well as other political groups) often expend the time and resources to engage in 
door-to-door canvassing to increase turnout in local contests.  
Labor unions spend quite a bit of their resources funding and staffing canvassing efforts. 
One of the many outcomes of the 2010 Supreme Court Case Citizens United v. FEC is that 
unions can canvass non-members as well as members. Prior to this Supreme Court decision, 
labor unions were restricted in how they could spend their money on election communication. 
Critically, it allowed labor unions to make independent expenditures from its general treasury 
without creating a political action committee (PAC). Now, unions can take member dues and 
spend them on materials in support of or opposition to a candidate for office with greater ease. In 
practice, this means they can knock on every door in a neighborhood, tripling or quadrupling the 
number of voters they reach. For example, in 2014, The Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) pledged to knock on 3 million doors over the eight months leading up to Election Day 
(The Economist, 2014). In a time when labor unions find their power dwindling, contact by labor 




labor unions include crowded presidential elections, they also include mid-term elections, off 
year elections, and special elections. Oftentimes, these contests include fights at the bottom of 
the ballot where a measure or referendum may directly impact members of a labor union within 
that jurisdiction such as the adoption of right to work laws that greatly hinder a union’s ability to 
organize their members. This paper outlines two experiments in Wisconsin during the April 1st, 
2014, spring election. I aimed to measure the effectiveness of door-to-door canvassing efforts by 
a local labor union in Stoughton and Oshkosh School Districts. Treatment groups were contacted 
at home in the three weeks leading up to the election. Control groups were not contacted. Unlike 
previous experiments conducted in face-to-face contact, canvassers were not paid.   They were 
volunteers working as part of a coalition who were invested in the success of a local initiative 
aimed at increasing funding for public schools. While not a direct comparison of paid versus 
volunteer canvassers, the findings of this research have strong programmatic implications for 
groups like labor unions, who have a vested interest in local election outcomes but not 
necessarily the monetary resources necessary for a paid field program.       
This paper proceeds as follows: The following section describes previous research on 
face-to-face contact. The next section makes the case for volunteer versus paid canvassers and 
examines how volunteerism might generate better results than paid canvassers. The subsequent 
section discusses the design and implementation of the experiments. I then analyze the 
effectiveness of the GOTV outreach in each school district and then for the sample as a whole. 
The results show that face-to-face interaction significantly increased voter turnout in the spring 
municipal 2014 election. Additionally, these effects are similar in magnitude to other canvassing 
experiments (Gerber and Green, 2000b; Gerber, Green and Nickerson, 2003; Michelson 2003; 




(though not conclusive) offers evidence that a cheaper, volunteer-based canvass may be a viable 
option going forward. Often, the most laborious process of a canvass operation is the recruitment 
of volunteers or paid canvassers. By being able to count on their membership to be viable 
communicators within their communities, labor unions may be able to drive mobilization in local 
elections where voter turnout is lacking.     
The Potency of Face-to-Face Contact 
Mobilizing an “army” of canvassers is not as easy as it used to be for labor unions, even 
though they are made of up members that are, on average, more politically aware than the typical 
voter.  David Brookman and Joshua Kalla note, “Decades ago, a rich network of civic 
organizations – think churches, Elk Lodges, and labor unions could supply amply volunteers for 
field work. But, as the organizations’ memberships have flagged, professionally-managed, 
centralized, DC-based groups with weaker grassroots ties have tended to take their place” 
(Brookman and Kalla, 2014). However, when an organization can successfully generate 
volunteers, engage on a local level, and conduct face-to-face mobilization prior to an election 
they are frequently successful at mobilizing and persuading voters.  The previous literature on 
canvassing almost universally indicates a positive impact on turnout or persuasion. This means 
that if an organization can clear the logistical hurdle to set up a canvass operation, it is usually 
worth their while. 
As noted by Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009), the effectiveness of door-to-door 
mobilization is straightforward. Canvassers are better able to connect with voters in person as 
opposed to via phone or mail. This makes the social pressure to participate even more effective. 
Additionally, emphasizing a local connection to the target increases the likelihood of the 




effective in motivating behaviors like recycling and blood donation (Jason et al., 1984; Reams 
and Ray 1993; Cotterill et al., 2009).  
Since the first face-to-face mobilization experiment conducted by Harold Gosnell in 
1927, political organizations, civic groups, and membership organizations similar to labor unions 
developed a storied history of utilizing canvassing to mobilize and/or persuade targeted voters. 
There is ample evidence that this is a viable tactic (Green, Gerber and Nickerson, 2003; Bennion, 
2005; Arceneaux, 2006; Middleton, 2006; Nickerson, 2006e). Additionally, there is evidence this 
tactic is effective among minorities (Michelson, 2005), students (Bennion, 2005), voters with 
lower predicted voter propensity scores (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009), and those sharing a 
household with a canvass target (Nickerson, 2006e).  Further investigations into canvass 
effectiveness have focused on the timing of the contact and found the most effective timing is the 
two weeks prior to Election Day (Nickerson, 2006c). In research comparing six different door-
to-door efforts, Gerber, Green and Nickerson (2003) found effect sizes ranging from 7.8 
percentage points to 14.4 percentage points in various off-year local elections. Small non-
partisan civic groups are not the only ones utilizing face-to face contact. In 2012, Obama 
Campaign Manager Jim Messina stressed the importance of “the Ground Game” as Obama for 
America set up 5,100 GOTV stations in battleground states. The campaign recruited 700,000 
volunteers to knock on doors in the weeks before the 2012 election (Obama for America, 2012).   
In 2004, MoveOn.org and Grassroots Campaigns Inc. utilized neighbor-to-neighbor 
canvassing in hopes of dramatically increasing turnout.  They concluded that targeting 
households with canvassers from a matching geographic region can increase turnout (Middleton 
and Green, 2008). Moreover, Sinclair, et al. (2008) targeted low-income voters in Los Angeles 




greater level than canvassers who were from the surrounding areas. Canvass targets were 
randomly assigned canvassers who were either from their zip code or from an area outside of the 
region. Targets that were canvassed by those sharing a zip code turned out at a higher rate than 
those contacted by a canvasser from a surrounding area. Multiple studies focusing on Hispanic 
voters have found that Hispanic canvassers achieve higher contact rates when targeting 
Hispanics, in turn resulting in increased treatment effects (Michelson, 2005; 2006). In sum, a 
connection between the canvasser and the target helps increase the effectiveness of the outreach 
effort. 
Research has also been conducted on the effectiveness of utilizing candidate canvasses 
during an election cycle. In 2004, Kevin Arceneaux partnered with a candidate for county 
commissioner in New Mexico during a primary election. Voters were assigned to be canvassed 
by either the candidate, a volunteer, or not at all. The candidate’s canvass increased support by 
42 percentage points among the voters they actually contacted (i.e. treatment-on-treated effects) 
while the paid canvasser increased support by only 18 percentage points. In 2010, economists at 
George Mason University partnered with a candidate in the 2010 general election. The candidate 
either personally canvassed households, left campaign literature, or did not contact a household. 
The canvass decreased total turnout, but among people who voted and who were successfully 
contacted, the canvass increased support by 21 percentage points. Although the literature did 
boost support by five percentage points, this was not statistically significant (Analyst Institute, 
2014). In June of 2016, the Analyst Institute conducted a meta-analysis on the effects of 
persuasion canvasses. They collected results from several past persuasion canvassing 
experiments and divided the results into either statewide and federal elections or low salience 




election). For statewide persuasion canvasses the average intent-to-treat (ITT) effect was 0.2 
percentage points and the average ITT effect for low salience elections was 2.1 percentage points 
(Analyst Institute , 2016). In sum, numerous studies show how canvassing can drive up voter 
turnout or voter support for a given candidate. 
The Case for Volunteer Canvassers 
Figure 3b in the appendix provides an overview of previous canvassing experiments and 
their effects on turnout. Previous research has overwhelmingly depended on paid canvassers to 
generate an effect on turnout. Although there are no direct comparisons of volunteer versus paid 
canvass effects, this research has been conducted with regard to professional versus volunteer 
campaign phone calls. Nickerson (2006) analyzed a series of eight volunteer phone campaigns to 
mobilize voters and found the phone calls increased turnout by 3.8 percentage points attributing 
the success of the phone calls to the chatty and informal nature of the calls. These results stood in 
contradiction to Gerber and Green (2000b; 2001), which found that professional calls had a null 
effect on turnout. In Nickerson’s (2007) comparison of calls by paid callers and volunteers, calls 
with a conversational tone increase voter participation. Paid callers can be as effective when 
coached to be conversational, and conversely the effectiveness of volunteers disappears when 
they are encouraged to be mechanical or overly hasty. Ha and Karlan (2009) validated the effect 
of using a conversational style call by varying the number of questions asked of the respondents 
using calls made by a commercial phone bank.  Given that the successful elements of volunteer 
communication are the ability to connect with the recipient of the communication, volunteer 
canvassers should experience similar success at increasing turnout.  
Another element of volunteer success lies in the intrinsic motivation or belief in the cause 




financial gain a volunteer can be motivated by a multitude of elements. Clary et al. (1998) 
highlight six main functions served by volunteering: values (expressing or acting on important 
values), understanding (seeking to learn more about the world or exercise skills that are often 
unused), enhancement (growing and developing psychologically through volunteer activities), 
career (gaining career-related experiences through volunteering), social (allows the individual to 
strengthen his or her social relationships), and protective (volunteering reduces negative 
feelings). For volunteers, these motivations generate the successful types of authentic 
conversations leading to an increase in voter turnout.  
Hypotheses 
The experiments I reported on were designed to evaluate the effectiveness of a labor 
union’s efforts to mobilize voters in a local election. Given the abundance of research pointing to 
the effective increase in voter turnout due to face-to-face contact, I expected to observe changes 
in voting rates based on assignment to either the treatment or control group in both experiments. 
My hypothesis is based on prior canvassing experiments: 
H1: Voters who receive face-to-face contact prior to the election will have higher rates of 
turnout tham those in the control group for each experiment. 
 Additionally, although I do not have a direct comparison, I expected to observe effect 
sizes in line with previous canvassing experiments that utilized paid canvassers. Based on the 
literature on volunteer actions and motivations I expected: 
H2: The higher rates of voter turnout for the treatment groups in each experiment will be 
similar in effect size as other previous canvassing experiments which utilized paid 







The canvassers in this experiment were from the communities in which they were 
canvassing. A vast majority of the canvassing volunteers were also members of the local labor 
union spearheading the campaign in favor of the public-school funding referendum on the ballot. 
Given the conclusions of previous research about the make-up of canvassers and the advantages 
of volunteer contact, my partner organization wanted to ensure each canvasser did not have to 
manufacture a local connection, but could speak with voters with a genuine, local perspective. 
Because previous research on canvassing indicated this approach would be successful, there is an 
expectation that even though these canvassers were not paid, their efforts would be effective at 
increasing turnout. From a practical perspective, paid canvasses often cost groups an average of 
20 dollars per vote (Gerber and Green, 2008).  My partner organization did not have the funding 
to conduct a paid canvass. This is not an uncommon problem as organizations often opt for less 
personal (and less expensive) communication such as mail or phone calls. However, the 
successful results of this experiment are particularly encouraging for smaller community groups 
and unions whose budgets may not allow for paid face-to-face contact. 
The training the volunteers received encouraged chatty and personal conversations with 
people at their doors. Instead of the chatty or personal conversations being imposed upon paid 
canvassers and having to be trained to have these types of conversations, these volunteers were 
able to access that ability without consciously activating it so their communication was perceived 
genuinely. The unpaid volunteer advantage is natural communication.  This is starkly different 






In March of 2014, a local union (in cooperation with a broader community coalition) 
spearheaded two canvass experiments in Stoughton and Oshkosh, Wisconsin to mobilize voters 
in the spring election. The ballot included a school operating referendum granting public schools 
the option to spend more money. Canvassers were unpaid volunteers with strong ties to the 
community (a majority of who were union members).   They received a basic script and training 
prior to working their shift. Canvasses occurred from March 20th to April 1st.  
The election in question was a local, city wide election including school district-specific 
referenda. In addition to the referendum in question, races on the ballot included County 
Supervisor, City Council, School Board and Court of Appeals. Spring elections occur often in 
Winnebago and Dane counties (where Oshkosh and Stoughton School Districts are located).  
Targets were randomly assigned to either receive a door-to-door canvass, or were placed 
in the control group. Treatment groups received two postcards about the referendum. Data was 
randomized at the household level, so that individuals in the same household were assigned to 
the same condition. In each experiment, 60 percent of the sample was assigned to the treatment 
group and 40 percent to the control group. This split was based on a discussion with the partner 
organization on how much of the population they felt comfortable assigning to the control group 
as well as how many doors they felt confident they could contact within the allotted timeframe.  
Summary tables regarding the balance across groups can be found in the appendix. 
In Stoughton, 2974 cases were randomly assigned to either the treatment or control 
group. 12,424 households in Oshkosh were randomly assigned to either a treatment group or 
control group.31   The treatment was a brief script identifying the partner organization and 
                                                 
31 The difference in universe size in the two cities is due to the difference in population size as well as the number of 




reminding the voter that there would be an election on April 1st.  The treatment script also 
mentioned to the target that there was a school referendum on the ballot. The treatments were 
intentionally concise to allow the canvasser to guide a free-flowing conversation. The full script 
for the treatments can be found in the appendix. 
Post-election, a commercial voter file vendor obtained the voter turnout records for 
Stoughton and Oshkosh cities. It should be noted that this paper does not rely on self-report vote 
history, but instead utilizes official vote record to determine the experiments’ effectiveness as 
opposed to self-reported voting behavior.  
As noted above, in both experiments, randomization was done at the household level. 
There were a total of 15,388 households (15,399 individuals).32   Tables 12, 13, and 14 show the 
quantities assigned to each condition.  The random assignment was well balanced for observable 
covariates about age, gender, race, and past voting in the previous three general elections. 
Results 
Intent-to-Treat Effects 
Randomized experiments provide an unbiased estimate of the effectiveness of being 
assigned to a treatment.33  Furthermore, there is a key obstacle that arises in field experiments.  
Some voters randomly assigned to the treatment group cannot be reached. In the case of canvass 
experiments, targets in households assigned to the treatment group may not be home when a 
canvasser knocks, may not come to the door, etc. Therefore, it becomes important to distinguish 
                                                 
32 My partner organization provided the targeting criteria for the canvass targets, which included an initial screen for 
multi-person households. Data was delivered to me for randomization that included 11 multi-person households. 
Given the small number of multi-person households, they were excluded from analysis. 
33 Anderson-Cook, Christine M. "Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal 




between intent-to-treat (ITT) effects and the effects on those actually contacted. ITT analysis 
includes every subject who is randomized according to randomized treatment assignment 
(ignoring noncompliance, deviation, withdrawal, or anything that happens after randomization). 
Treatment-on-treated (TOT) analysis is limited to those who actually received the treatment. In 
the case of these experiments, the TOT analysis is limited to those who were successfully 
canvassed. The canvasser at the door marked a successful canvass electronically.  The interaction 
data was matched back to the original randomized list in order to conduct this analysis. 
Table 15 provides results on the intent-to-treat effect and the treatment on treated effects. 
The intent-to-treat effects of face-to-face contact are calculated by examining the mean voting 
rate of control and treatment groups while controlling other factors impacting turnout (i.e., age, 
race, vote history, etc.).34  Column A in Table 3 presents the difference in turnout between the 
control and treatment groups in each city.  In both Stoughton and Oshkosh, the treatment group 
turned out at a higher rate than the control group. In Stoughton, the turnout rate of the control 
group was 43.5 percent, while the turnout of the treatment group was 46.2 percent. The increase 
between the control and treatment group was 2.7 percentage points and is statistically significant 
(p=0.086; one-tailed). In Oshkosh, the turnout rate of the control group was 44.3 percent and the 
turnout of the treatment group was 46.5 percent. The increase between the control and treatment 
group was 2.2 percentage points and is statistically significant (p=0.017; one-tailed). Taking both 
experiments into account, face-to-face contact has an intent-to-treat effect of 2.3 percentage 
points.  The combined turnout of the control groups is 44.2 percent and the turnout of the 
treatment group is 46.4 percent. This difference between groups is statistically significant at 
conventional levels (p=0.006; one-tailed), and is consistent with previous canvassing experiment 
                                                 




results. Academics and practitioners alike utilize these intent-to-treat estimates to determine the 
effectiveness of GOTV on aggregate levels of turnout. The results I have reported fall within the 
range of effect sizes presented in previous work (see Gerber and Green, 2000b; Gerber, Green 
and Nickerson, 2003; Michelson 2003; Nickerson 2006e).  
Effect of Canvass Contact 
As Nickerson et al. (2005) point out, “The chief advantage of field experiments is that 
inquiry takes place under real-world conditions, thereby ameliorating concerns about external 
validity. The downside to the real-world setting is that political [groups] cannot feasibly contact 
every targeted voter” (p. 6). Estimating the mobilizing effect of the canvassing among those in 
the treatment group requires an additional step to account for the fact that many voters in the 
treatment were never contacted. Instances where canvassers found no one home, incorrect 
addresses, non-locatable addresses, or where the target dismissed them, all contribute to a 
diminished rate of actual contact within the treatment groups.35   Column B in Table 15 shows 
the rate at which those in the treatment group actually received the treatment. In Stoughton, just 
fewer than one in three targets was actually canvassed.  In Oshkosh, the number dwindled to one 
in ten. While these numbers may seem low (especially compared to contact rates of other 
campaign communication modes), they fall in line with previous canvassing experiments. 
Gerber, Green and Nickerson (2003) witnessed an average contact rate across six sites just below 
thirty percent (with the lowest rate being near 14 percent). Additionally, Nickerson, Friedrichs 
and King (2005) witness a contact rate of just eight percent.   
                                                 
35 It is worth noting that temperatures at the canvassing sites during the time of the canvass were at or below 
freezing:  an average minimum temperature of 23 degrees Fahrenheit. This led to canvassers failing to show up for 




 Column C reports the effects of being successfully contacted.36 The impact of successful 
contacts in the city of Stoughton is 8.5 percentage points (p=0.085). In Oshkosh, the impact of a 
target being successfully canvassed is 21.7 percentage points (p=0.016). Overall, I found an 
average treatment effect of 17.0 percentage points. This estimate is statistically significant at the 
.01 level using a one-tailed test.  Table 17 reports the full output of the two-stage least squares 
estimates of the effect of actual contact.  
 For the local labor union I partnered with, the most rewarding finding was that both 
referenda passed. In Oshkosh, the measure passed with 59.4 percent of the vote.  In Stoughton, it 
passed with 63 percent of the vote.  The results above reiterate that face-to-face contact is a 
viable mobilization tactic in GOTV efforts. These results are similar to those found by similar 
studies examining GOTV canvassing efforts across various elections and in multiple states. 
While campaigns look to expand the ways in which they communicate with voters (phone, text, 
advertisements via social networking websites, etc.) my findings (and that of previous research) 
indicate that the best method remains face-to-face contact. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In 1999, Gerber and Green noted,  
If voting is primarily a matter of individuals' enduring propensities to vote, little 
can be done about declining turnout rates short of changing the ways in which 
children are raised by their parents or socialized in schools. On the other hand, 
                                                 
36 The estimator in Column C is the equivalent of performing a two-stage least squares regression of vote on actual 
contact using randomization as the instrumental variable. For other examples see: Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996, 




those who stress environmental factors propose to ease registration requirements 
or reinvigorate parties and other mobilizing organizations. (p. 10941)  
Essentially, if agents of mobilization (for example civic groups, political parties, or labor 
unions) are to blame for lagging turnout, they can also be part of the solution (as evidenced by 
the results of this research). Particularly in non-presidential years, when voters report levels of 
contact that are a fourth of what they are during presidential election years (Goldstein, 2002). 
The results presented in this paper echo the results of previous research findings that 
canvassing mobilization campaigns have the ability to increase turnout in local elections. In 
addition, this research builds on previous canvassing experiments because it examined the use of 
volunteer canvassers, as opposed to paid canvassed efforts. Although it is often the most taxing 
type of campaign communication, face-to-face contact remains one of the most effective ways of 
increasing turnout in a given election.  Overall, each successful canvass with a registered voter 
increases the voter’s probability of voting by 17 percentage points, which is impressive 
considering the average level of turnout in municipal elections hovers around 25 percent (Alford 
and Lee, 1968; Morlan, 1984; Bridges, 1997). While voter turnout may fall during these contests, 
their ballots arguably have a greater chance of affecting the outcome of the election. In this same 
vein, the contact made during these elections may be more meaningful, as there is less of it 
overall.  GOTV efforts ironically tend to be low in local elections, compared to statewide or 
national contests, further compounding the disparities between voters and non-voters. This 
research shows that volunteer canvassers in a local GOTV effort had a striking impact on voter 
participation.   
 The results of this experiment also have implications for how labor unions and other 




communication. In this case, utilizing volunteer canvassers saved the group thousands of dollars 
in paid communication and produced results greater than those produced in previous research 
with paid canvassers.   
 As with any field experiment in a given election, this research should be replicated across 
election types and locations to ensure external validity. However, the results make a compelling 
argument that if there is a volunteer base from which to draw, volunteer canvassers may be just 
as effective as paid canvass efforts. An admitted shortcoming of this research is the lack of direct 
comparison of volunteer versus paid canvasses and future research should investigate this 















 This dissertation offers evidence from three different field experiments (conducted in 
cooperation with a labor union) that mass membership organizations can drive the political 
actions of their members but with varying levels of success. Academics and practitioners alike 
have long maintained that mass membership organizations, such as labor unions, play a critical 
role in the participation levels of their members in the realms of voting, political participation, 
issue advocacy, and other political activity. However, this research indicates that despite recent 
hurdles, labor unions are a critical element in the civic participation of their members. 
 In Chapter two, I expanded on previous work within the GOTV field experiment 
literature by testing two long-standing practices: social pressure and plan making. In a first of its 
kind experiment, I compare these tactics in encouraging union members either to vote early in-
person or to return their mail ballot across two experiments in Arizona and Florida. I found that 
both social pressure and plan making statistically increased turnout in both experiments; 
however, the differences between the treatments were indistinguishable from zero. In examining 
treatment effects by previous method of voting, I found some evidence that plan making may not 
be effective with voters who have a history of voting prior to Election Day in previous elections. 
These results are encouraging for labor unions on several fronts: 1) Labor unions can 
successfully increase the overall turnout of their members; 2)This increase can occur in states 
(such as Arizona and Florida) where union density is not very high; and 3) As states increase the 
opportunities to cast one’s ballot prior to Election Day, labor unions can utilize these reforms to 




        Chapter three offered a lens into how labor unions optimize advocacy programs to spur 
greater action by their members. In building on previous advocacy experiments, I examined four 
different script types to see if any generated greater rates of patch-throughs to state legislator 
offices. Unfortunately, I did not find any differences in patch-through rates across conditions. 
However, in examining subgroup analysis, I did discover that union members of color were more 
likely to patch through to legislators of color compared to their white union counterparts. This 
finding is supported by previous literature, indicating  people are more likely to patch-through to 
their representative’s office as they share the same racial or partisan identity. As labor unions 
find themselves with an increasingly diverse workforce, mobilizing union members of color will 
be critical for survival. Additionally, the fact that they appeared to participate at a higher rate 
than their white counterparts can be an incredible tool for labor unions within the world of 
legislative advocacy. 
 The final field experiment in chapter four examines the effectiveness of a volunteer 
canvass operation in a local election. In the three weeks leading up to Election Day, the treatment 
group received one face-to-face contact from a community membership organization 
encouraging them to vote in the spring election. Post-election turnout records determined that the 
canvass successfully stimulated turnout among those who received a face-to-face contact from 
the volunteer canvassers. Additionally, this effect was equal to or greater than similar canvass 
operations conducted by paid canvassers. While this chapter lacks a direct comparison, the initial 
findings indicate that smaller organizations or labor unions may be able to rely on volunteer 
canvassers and that their efforts will be impactful.  
 Each chapter offers a view into a particular mobilization effort conducted by different 




greatest impact on voter turnout was achieved by face-to-face contact. While each of these 
experiments is limited in its generalizability, the opportunity to directly collaborate with a labor 
union and optimize their political mobilization programs cannot be understated. Much of the 
existing literature on mass membership organizations focuses specifically on labor unions. This 
research certainly lacks the perfection that can be achieved in a laboratory type setting, but field 
experiments incorporating real life campaign elements are often hard to logistically accomplish, 
making the contributions of this work unique and impactful.  
 The success or failure of labor unions to optimize tactics to mobilize their members and 
supporters has consequences affecting a much larger coalition of people. While each of my 
chapters focuses on a specific field experiment, the collective goal of these interventions is to 
offer tactics for labor unions to increase their political power in the United States. This is cyclical 
process: As more members are mobilized to take political action, there’s a greater chance of 
electing pro-union candidates. In turn, these legislators are more likely to pass labor friendly 
policies like protecting collective bargaining, overturning right to work laws, or protecting public 
pensions, which greatly increases the ability of labor unions to organize.  The easier it is for a 
labor union to organize their members, the greater the power of the union, the easier it becomes 
to mobilize union members and the community around them. Each of these experiments is a step 
toward ensuring the next revolution of that cycle. 
Future Research 
 Given the nature of field experimental work, all of the research presented here would 
have to be bolstered by additional experiments.  This is not as straightforward as collecting 
additional observational data. However, provided there was an opportunity, there are a number of 




mobilization. First and foremost, I think replicating a similar legislative advocacy experiment to 
the one I conducted in chapter three by increasing the size of the targeted universe may generate 
better results. The racial subgroup analysis proved very promising. However, increasing the 
overall size of the universe or the length in the campaign might have allowed for the detection of 
differences across scripts within the subgroups. Additionally, including more targeted legislators 
of different races would allow for more precise subgroup analysis on patch-through rates by race. 
This would provide even further strategic guidance for labor unions in not only determining 
which script would generate the greatest rate of legislative advocacy among their members, but 
also if different scripts performed better among different subgroups of their membership. 
I would like to expand on chapter four regarding the research on volunteer canvassing 
operations. Specifically, utilizing a field experiment to directly measure the impact of volunteer 
versus paid canvassers on voter turnout or persuasion on a candidate or issue. While chapter 
three offers evidence that volunteer canvassers can be just as effective in increasing voter turnout 
as paid canvassers, an additional experiment including a direct comparison would better answer 
this question. As labor unions weight the monetary cost of communication to their members in 
the face of shrinking margins, knowing the volunteer communication may be just as potent as 
paid, face-to-face communication is a critical insight for future resource allocation.  
 Labor unions have many unique opportunities to not only increase the political activity of 
their members but also those in their immediate networks. Several pieces of research 
demonstrate that networks can structure participation (e.g., Bond et al., 2012; Nickerson, 2008; 
Mann and Klofstad, 2012) and shape preferences (e.g., Sinclair et al., 2012).  Two networks 
union members consistently interact with are those with who they share a household and those 




member indicated union household turnout at higher rates than non-union households. In an 
experiment conducted in cooperation with a labor union, The Analyst Institute discovered that 
letters sent to the union member encouraging them to talk to the householder on which candidate 
to support was more effective than letters directly addressed to the householder from the union. 
This indicates that discussions among those sharing a household with a union member may be a 
point of leverage for labor unions to increase turnout or persuasion of non-members (The 
Analyst Institute, 2014). Another promising avenue of research for labor unions is how they can 
leverage worksites to persuade or increase turnout of their members. A previous field experiment 
found evidence of the social transmission of information within the worksite. The experiment 
found that respondents sharing a workplace with those who were invited to a town hall forum 
(the treated) were more likely to report hearing about the ballot measure, and to cite the 
treatment communication as a source through which they heard about it (Mann et al., 2014). 
Pushing this research forward to include efforts to drive turnout or union membership via the 
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M 3: Vote History Treatment Phone Scripts 
 
‘Vote History’ Treatment – EIPV 
Hi, this is ________ from ______.  May I please speak to ________? 
Hi, _______.  I’m calling to thank you for being a good voter in the past and ask you to vote in 
the primary election will be held on August 26th. You should have received a letter summarizing 
your recent voting activity. Voting takes time and energy, and we want to thank you for doing 
your part. We hope that you will continue your record of exercising your civic duty by voting in 
the important election on Tuesday, August 26th.  
You can vote at any early voting location in <countyname> County. Early Voting is open from 
<day_1> to <day_2>. You can find information about voting locations and hours, including any 
last minute changes at <url> or by calling the <county_office> at <county_phone>.  
Thank you in advance for voting. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting 
















‘Vote History Treatment - Absentee 
Hi, this is ________ from ______.  May I please speak to ________? 
Hi, _______.  I’m calling to thank you for being a good voter in the past and ask you to vote in 
the primary election will be held on August 26th. You should have received a letter summarizing 
your recent voting activity. Voting takes time and energy, and we want to thank you. We hope 
that you will continue your record of exercising your civic duty by voting in the important 
election on Tuesday, August 26th.   
You should have received your ballot from the <county_office> for the August 26th primary 
election. If your ballot did not arrive in the mail, or if you need a new ballot, please call the 
<county_office> at <county_phone> to request a replacement ballot. Your ballot must arrive in 
the Clerk’s Office by August 26th. Mail it early enough or drop it off at a location set up by the 
<county_office>. For locations and hours to drop of your ballot go to <url>.  
Thank you in advance for voting. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting 













M 4: Make a Plan Phone Scripts  
 
‘Make a Plan’ – EIPV 
Hi, this is ________ from _______.  May I please speak to ______? 
Hi, _______.  As you know, the primary election will be held on August 26th. You should have 
received a letter listing the early voting locations available in <countyname> County. Early 
Voting is open from <day_1> to <day_2>. You can find information about voting locations and 
hours, online or by calling the <county_office>.  
 Have you planned what time and day you think you’ll be voting?   
o (prompt if needed: you can vote early in the morning, before work, at lunch time, 
in the afternoon, in the evening. ) 
o prompt if needed: You can look at the mailing we sent or I can give you the 
website or the phone number for the county election office where you can detailed 
information on where to vote and when they are open. <URL> and 
<countyphone> 
 At which of the early voting locations do you plan on voting?  
o prompt if needed: You can look at the mailing we sent or I can give you the 
website or the phone number for the county election office where you can detailed 
information on where to vote and when they are open. <URL> and < 
countyphone> 
Thank you in advance for voting. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting 






‘Make a Plan’ – Absentee 
Hi, this is ________ from _______.  May I please speak to ______? 
Hi, ________.  As you know, the primary election will be held on August 26th.  You should have 
received your ballot from the <county_office> for the August 26th primary election. If your 
ballot did not arrive in the mail, or if you need a new ballot, please call the <county_office> at 
<county_phone> to request a replacement ballot. Your ballot must arrive in the Clerk’s Office 
by August 26th. Mail it early enough or drop it off at a location set up by the <county_office>. 
For locations and hours to drop of your ballot go to <url>.  
 When do you think you’ll fill out and return your ballot?  (prompt if needed: today, 
tomorrow, in the next few days, right before Election Day) 
 
 Are you sending your ballot back in the mail or do you plan to drop it off? 
Thank you in advance for voting. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting 




















Table 1: Balance Check: Mean Values of Observable Covariates within EIPV Experiment 
 
 Control Vote history  Plan Making Total 
Age 48.04 48.10 47.98 48.04 
     
     
# Voters in Household 1.067 1.068 1.069 1.068 
     
     
Hispanic^ 0.124 0.119 0.120 0.121 
     
     
African American^ 0.234 0.232 0.227 0.231 
     
     
Female 0.796 0.789 0.797 0.794 
     
     
Voted in 2006 General 
Election 
0.538 0.537 0.539 0.538 
Voted in 2008 General 
Election 
0.872 0.868 0.869 0.870 
Voted in 2010 General 
Election 
0.653 0.654 0.654 0.654 
Voted in 2012 General 
Election 
0.895 0.893 0.891 0.893 
     
     
Voted in 2006 Primary 
Election 
0.173 0.171 0.172 0.172 
Voted in 2008 Primary 
Election 
0.151 0.149 0.152 0.151 
Voted in 2010 Primary 
Election 
0.147 0.147 0.150 0.148 
Voted in 2012 Primary 
Election 
0.130 0.128 0.127 0.128 
     
Observations 14,031 14,060 14,040 42,131 
mean coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 















Table 2: Balance Check: Mean Values of Observable Covariates within Random Assignment 
Groups in VBM Experiment 
 
 Control Thank You Plan Making Total 
Age 49.99 49.69 50.16 49.95 
     
     
# Voters in Household 1.066 1.065 1.077 1.070 
     
     
Hispanic^ 0.124 0.119 0.124 0.122 
     
     
African American^ 0.116 0.112 0.122 0.117 
     
     
Female 0.799 0.808 0.796 0.801 
     
     
Voted in 2006 General 
Election 
0.599 0.600 0.587 0.595 
     
     
Voted in 2008 General 
Election 
0.895 0.890 0.889 0.892 
     
     
Voted in 2010 General 
Election 
0.707 0.711 0.709 0.709 
     
     
Voted in 2012 General 
Election 
0.945 0.947 0.943 0.945 
     
     
Voted in 2006 Primary 
Election 
0.192 0.193 0.182 0.189 
     
     
Voted in 2008 Primary 
Election 
0.240 0.239 0.244 0.241 
     
     
Voted in 2010 Primary 
Election 
0.205 0.206 0.208 0.206 
     
     
Voted in 2012 Primary 
Election 
0.196 0.198 0.202 0.199 
     
Observations 4,018 3,998 4,031 12,047 
mean coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 











p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test 
Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Control 



















 (1)  (2)   (3)  
 Vote history  vs. 
Control 
 Plan Making vs. 
Control 
  Vote history  vs. 
Plan Making 
 
 b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2  p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u 
Overall 
Turnout 
0.010** 0.003 0.011**  0.001 -0.001 0.389 
 (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.004)  
 0.149  0.150   0.149  




-0.001 0.303 0.000  0.334 -0.001 0.172 
 (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.002)  
 0.040  0.041   0.040  




VMB or EIPV) 
0.011*** <0.001 0.010***  <0.001 -0.001 0.339 
 (0.003)  (0.003)   (0.002)  
 0.110  0.109   0.110  
 0.099  0.099   0.109  
 





Table 4: Difference in Mean Turnout and Voting Method in 2014 Primary Election - EIPV 
Mobilization 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Vote history  vs. 
Control 
 Plan Making vs. 
Control 
 Vote history  vs. 
Plan Making 
 
 b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u 
Overall Turnout 0.005 0.072 0.009* 0.006 -0.004 0.847 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
 0.096  0.099  0.096  
 0.091  0.091  0.099  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Vote history  vs. 
Control 
 Plan Making vs. 
Control 
 Vote history  vs. 
Plan Making 
 
 b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u 
Election Day 
Voting 
-0.001 0.626 0.002 0.206 -0.003 0.873 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
 0.047  0.050  0.047  
 0.048  0.048  0.050  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Vote history  vs. 
Control 
 Plan Making vs. 
Control 
 Vote history  vs. 
Plan Making 
 
 b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u 
Pre-Election 
Day Voting 
(either VMB or 
EIPV) 
0.006* 0.009 0.007** 0.004 -0.001 0.608 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
 0.049  0.050  0.049  
 0.043  0.043  0.050  
Observations 28091  28071  28100  
p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test 
Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Control 





















Table 5: Difference in Mean Turnout and Voting Method in 2014 Primary Election - VBM 
Mobilization 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Vote history  vs. 
Control 
 Plan Making vs. 
Control 
 Vote history  vs. 
Plan Making 
 
 b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u 
Overall Turnout 0.030** 0.002 0.020* 0.027 0.010 0.178 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  
 0.341  0.331  0.341  
 0.311  0.311  0.331  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Vote history  vs. 
Control 
 Plan Making vs. 
Control 
 Vote history  vs. 
Plan Making 
 
 b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u 
Election Day 
Voting 
-0.002 0.778 -0.003 0.881 0.001 0.339 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
 0.015  0.014  0.015  
 0.017  0.017  0.014  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Vote history  vs. 
Control 
 Plan Making vs. 
Control 
 Vote history  vs. 
Plan Making 
 
 b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u b/se/mu_1/mu_2 p_u 
Pre-Election 
Day Voting 
(either VMB or 
EIPV) 
0.032** 0.001 0.023* 0.011 0.009 0.204 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
 0.326  0.317  0.326  
 0.294  0.294  0.317  
Observations 8016  8049  8029  
p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test 
Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Control 



















M 5: Patch Through Scripts 
 
Baseline Script:   
Hi, this is ______ from the [ORGANIZATION NAME]. [ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN] 
[TARGET] needs to hear from us that we oppose the Governor’s Education Tax Credit. The tax 
credit will divert $150 million away from public schools in order to fund private schools; public 
schools serve all children in our communities – not a selective few. New York state public 
schools are still owed approximately $5 billion dollars. Representatives need to hear that New 
York public schools should be the priority. 
Make your voice heard, we’ll connect you to [ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN] [TARGET]’s office 
and you can tell them that as a constituent you want them to stand against the Governor’s 
Education Tax proposal. 
Can we connect you to Representative [TARGET]’s office? 
Q1 01 IF YES: Great! We’ll connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]’s office.  
Tell them that you’re a constituent and that you want them to stand against Cuomo’s Education 
Tax Credit.  Got all that? [pause] Great I’ll connect you now. 
 PT 01 Patch successful 
 PT 02 Patch unsuccessful: Looks like the line is busy.  I’d like to encourage you to still 
contact your [ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN].  The number is [patchnum].  Got that? [pause] 
Thank you, have a great day. [end] 







Baseline Script + Urgency:  
Hi, this is ______ from the [ORGANIZATION NAME]. ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN 
[TARGET] needs to hear from us today that we oppose the Governor’s Education Act Tax 
Credit. The tax credit will cut $150 million away from public schools in order to fund private 
schools; public schools serve all children in our communities – not a selective few. New York 
state public schools are still owed approximately $5 billion dollars now. Representatives need to 
hear that New York public schools should be the priority today. 
To make sure they hear your request today, we’ll connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN 
[TARGET]’s office now and you can tell them right away that as a constituent you want them to 
stand against the Governor’s Education Tax proposal. 
Can we connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]’s office? 
Q1 01 IF YES: Great! In just a second we’ll connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN 
[target]’s office.  Tell them that you’re a constituent and that you want them to stand against 
Cuomo’s Parental Choice in Education Act Tax Credits now.  Got all that? [pause] Great I’ll 
connect you now. 
 PT 01 Patch successful 
 PT 02 Patch unsuccessful: Looks like the line is busy.  I’d like to encourage you to still 
contact your ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN.  The number is [patchnum].  Got that? [pause] Thank 
you, have a great day. [end] 







Baseline Script + Activist Identity:  
Hi, this is ______ from the [ORGANIZATION NAME]. ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN 
[TARGET] needs to hear from education supporters like you that you oppose the Governor’s 
Education Act Tax Credit. We are calling supporters like you who have made your voice heard 
in the past to tell representatives that the tax credits will divert $150 million away from public 
schools in order to fund private schools; public schools serve all children in our communities – 
not a selective few. New York state public schools are still owed approximately $5 billion 
dollars. Representatives need to hear that politically engaged constituents like you know New 
York public schools should be the priority. 
To join thousands of other supporters making their voice heard we can connect you to 
ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]’s office and you can tell them that as an active 
constituent you want them to stand against the Governor’s Education Tax proposal. 
Can we connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]’s office? 
Q1 01 IF YES: Great! We’ll connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [target]’s office.  Tell 
them that you’re one of thousands of politically engaged constituents that want them to stand 
against Cuomo’s Education Tax Credit. Got all that? [pause] Great I’ll connect you now. 
 PT 01 Patch successful 
 PT 02 Patch unsuccessful: Looks like the line is busy.  I’d like to encourage you to still 
contact your ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN.  The number is [patchnum].  Got that? [pause] Thank 
you, have a great day. [end] 






Baseline Script + Ease:  
Hi, this is ______ from the [ORGANIZATION NAME]. ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN 
[TARGET] needs to hear that you oppose the Governor’s Education Act Tax Credit. Don’t 
worry - contacting your representative is quick and easy. The tax credits will divert $150 million 
dollars away from public schools in order to find private schools; public schools serve all 
children in our communities – not a selective few. We can help you quickly tell your 
representative that New York Public schools should be the priority. 
Making your voice heard is easy - we simply connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN 
[TARGET]’s office and you tell them that you want them to stand against the Governor’s 
Education Tax proposal- we do all the work to connect you. 
Can we quickly connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]’s office? 
Q1 01 IF YES: Great! We’ll connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [target]’s office.  Tell 
them that you want them to stand against Cuomo’s Education Tax Credit. Got all that? [pause] 
Great I’ll connect you now. 
 PT 01 Patch successful 
 PT 02 Patch unsuccessful: Looks like the line is busy.  I’d like to encourage you to still 
contact your ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN.  The number is [patchnum].  Got that? [pause] Thank 
you, have a great day. [end] 























Age 63.87 63.91 63.92 63.97 63.92 
      
Hispanic^ 0.143 0.139 0.137 0.143 0.141 
      
African 
American^ 
0.263 0.256 0.261 0.264 0.261 
      
Female 0.605 0.611 0.609 0.609 0.609 




0.926 0.928 0.927 0.930 0.928 




0.855 0.858 0.860 0.859 0.858 




0.930 0.928 0.927 0.924 0.927 




0.628 0.626 0.620 0.627 0.625 
      
Observations 49350     
 
mean coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
















Table 7: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Random Assignment on Observable Covariates 
 Patch Through Experiment 
Baseline (BASE) 
Baseline + Urgency  
Age -0.000  (0.001) 
Hispanic^ -0.041  (0.038) 
African American^ -0.047  (0.031) 
Female 0.031  (0.026) 
Voted in 2008 General Election 0.024 (0.051) 
Voted in 2010 General Election 0.021  (0.039) 
Voted in 2012 General Election -0.044  (0.051) 
Voted in 2014 General Election 0.000  (0.027) 
Constant 0.008  (0.083) 
Baseline + Identity  
Age -0.000  (0.001) 
Hispanic^ -0.050  (0.038) 
African American^ -0.019  (0.030) 
Female 0.019  (0.026) 
Voted in 2008 General Election -0.007  (0.051) 
Voted in 2010 General Election 0.041  (0.039) 
Voted in 2012 General Election -0.045  (0.051) 
Voted in 2014 General Election -0.030  (0.027) 
Constant 0.037  (0.083) 
Baseline + Ease  
Age 0.000  (0.001) 
Hispanic^ 0.001  (0.038) 
African American^ 0.005  (0.030) 
Female 0.020  (0.026) 
Voted in 2008 General Election 0.055  (0.051) 
Voted in 2010 General Election 0.029  (0.039) 
Voted in 2012 General Election -0.094  (0.050) 
Voted in 2014 General Election 0.002  (0.027) 









Standard errors in parentheses 
Notes: ^Race data is based on Catalist LLC's predictive models. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 8: Difference in Mean Patch Through Rate (Overall) 
 



























-0.017 0.795 0.004 0.430 -0.004 0.575 0.020 0.161 0.013 0.264 -0.007 0.641 
SE (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.021)  
Mean of 
Treatment 
0.354  0.374  0.367  0.374  0.367  0.367  
Mean of 
Control 
0.370  0.370  0.370  0.370  0.370  0.370  
Observations 2267  2249  2255  2232  2238  2220  
 
p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test 
Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Baseline 






Table 9: Difference in Mean Patch Through Rate by Race (Overall) 
 














0.006 0.384 0.046 0.060 
 (0.020)  (0.029)  
 0.368  0.380  
 0.362  0.334  
Observations 2827  1660  
 
p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test 
Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of PT Rate of Union Members of Color; Row 4 = Mean of 
PT       Rate of White Union Members 





















Table 10: Difference in Mean Patch Through Rate of White Union Members to White Legislators (Overall) 
 
 












































-0.012 0.654 0.005 0.429 -0.035 0.879 0.017 0.284 -0.023 0.783 -0.040 0.909 
 (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  
 0.361  0.378  0.337  0.378  0.337  0.337  
 0.372  0.372  0.372  0.361  0.361  0.378  
Observations 1048  1016  1025  1022  1031  999  
p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test 
Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Baseline 















Table 11: Difference in Mean Patch Through Rate of Union Members of Color to Legislators of Color (Overall) 
 











































Patch Through -0.007 0.575 -0.009 0.597 -0.001 0.510 -0.002 0.521 0.006 0.436 0.008 0.414 
 (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.038)  
 0.377  0.375  0.383  0.375  0.383  0.383  
 0.384  0.384  0.384  0.377  0.377  0.375  
Observations 654  685  662  657  634  665  
p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test 
Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Baseline 
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M 6: Canvassing Script 
 
Hello, is [TARGET NAME] home? My name is [FIRST NAME].  
I am a volunteer with [PARTNER ORGANIZATION] and we are out today encouraging 
people in our community to vote on Tuesday April, 1st. As you may know, there is a referendum 
on the ballot to increase revenue for public schools in your community. You have the power to 
make a difference in your community. Can we count on you to vote on April 1st? 



































Table 12: Randomization Balance Check - Stoughton Experiment 
 
  Treatment Control 
Households 1983 991 
Average Age 55.4 55.9 
Average Pct. White 91 91 
Average Pct. Female 59.3 59.6 
Voted in 2012 89.9 90 
Voted in 2010 75.6 75.8 
Voted in 2008 84.1 84.2 
Voted in 2006 71 71 
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Assignment on Covariates     











Number of Households 9333 3081 
Average Age 53.7 53.7 
Average Pct. White 91.3 90.1 
Average Pct. Female 53.6 53.3 
Voted in 2012 90.5 90 
Voted in 2010 77.3 77.6 
Voted in 2008 86.5 86.1 
Voted in 2006 71.5 72 
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Assignment on Covariates     



































Number of Households 11,316 4072 
Average Age 54 54.1 
Average Pct. White 91.2 91 
Average Pct. Female 54.7 54.8 
Voted in 2012 90.1 90 
Voted in 2010 77 76.2 
Voted in 2008 86.1 85.7 
Voted in 2006 71.4 71.9 
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Assignment on Covariates     






































































  (0.9) (6.8) 
Standard errors in parentheses 


















Table 16: Percentage Point Boost on Aggregate Turnout 
 
 Stoughton Oshkosh Overall 
   (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   ( e)   (f)  
Treatment 3.3** 2.7* 2.0** 2.2** 2.3** 2.3** 
 (1.9) (1.9) (1.0) (1.0) (6.7) (0.9) 
Age  -0.1**  -0.04*  -0.05 ** 
  (0.06)  (0.0)  (0.0) 
Female  -9.9  -0.1  -1.8** 
  (1.9)  (0.9)  (0.8) 
White  26.9***  1.4  0.8 
  (5.6)  (2.1)  (2.0) 
Voted in 12  38.2***  17.7***  19*** 
  (2.8)  (1.9)  (1.7) 
Voted in 10  17.6***  9.3***  10.8*** 
  (2.6)  (1.3)  (1.1) 
Voted in 08  10.0**   -0.6  0.1 
  (3.6)  (1.9)  (1.7) 
Voted in 06  17.0***  16.6***  16.6*** 
  (2.7)  (1.2)  (1.2) 
Constant 43.5*** -41.4*** 44.3*** 11.4*** 44.2*** 10.5*** 
  (1.5) (7.3) (0.8) (2.3) (0.8) (2.1) 
N 2974 2974 12,424 12,424 15,398 15,398 
*OLS Estimates. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 






Table 17: Percentage Point Boost from Face-to-Face Contact 
 
 Stoughton Oshkosh Overall 
   (a)   (b)    (c)    (d)   ( e)   (f)  
Door-to-Door 
Contact 11.3** 8.5** 20.0** 21.7** 17.2** 17.0** 
 (6.6) (6.20) -10.1 -10.3 (6.7) (6.7) 
Age  -0.1**  -0.04  -0.06 ** 
  (0.06)  (0.0)  (0.0) 
Female  -10  -0.08  -1.9** 
  (1.9)  (0.9)  (0.8) 
White  26.7***  0.08  0.3 
  (6.4)  (2.2)  (2.0) 
Voted in 12  37.0***  17.0***  18.2*** 
  (5.0)  (2.2)  (2.0) 
Voted in 10  17.3***  8.9***  10.5*** 
  (2.8)  (1.3)  (1.2) 
Voted in 08  10.1 **   -0.5  0.4 
  (3.8)  (1.9)  (1.7) 
Voted in 06  16.8***  16.4***  16.3*** 
  (2.7)  (1.2)  (1.2) 
Constant 43.5*** -39.4 44.3*** 12.8*** 44.2*** 12.4*** 
  (1.5) (9.0) (0.8) (2.3) (0.8) (2.2) 
N 2974 2974 12,424 12,424 15398 15398 
*estimates calculated from 2SLS using assignment as instrument for contact. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; one-tailed 
*OLS Estimates. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
































































Mobilization Type Control Group Voter Report Card Plan Making Control Voter Report Card Plan Making
Early Voting 581 587 605 13540 13473 13435





Table S 2: Balance Check: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Random Assignment on 
Observable Covariates for EIPV and VBM Experiments 
 EIPV Experiment VBM Experiment 
Control (BASE) (BASE) 

























































































































N 42,131 12,047 
LR 11.993 22.021 
df 26.000 26.000 
p_value 0.991 0.688 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Notes: ^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table S 3: Logistic Regression for Average Treatment Effect on Turnout in 2014 Primary Election Based on Mobilization Type 




























 b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p 








0.727 0.135* 0.006 0.019 0.140* 0.005 0.016 
 (0.041)   (0.043)   (0.056)   (0.057)   (0.057)   (0.058)   
Make A 
Plan 
0.101* 0.009 0.013 0.110** 0.007 0.009 0.046 0.002 0.412 0.045 0.001 0.427 0.150** 0.007 0.009 0.158** 0.005 0.007 
 (0.041)   (0.042)   (0.056)   (0.057)   (0.057)   (0.058)   
Female    -0.034  0.409    -0.106  0.054    0.047  0.410 
    (0.042)      (0.055)      (0.057)   
Age    0.015***  0.000    0.003  0.213    0.024***  0.000 
    (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.002)   
African 
American^ 
   -0.210***  0.000    -0.224***  0.000    -0.159**  0.006 
    (0.042)      (0.056)      (0.057)   
Hispanic^    -0.630***  0.000    -1.138***  0.000    -0.224**  0.008 





   0.997***  0.000    1.263***  0.000    0.782***  0.000 





   1.367***  0.000    1.180***  0.000    1.338***  0.000 





   0.451***  0.000    0.554***  0.000    0.336***  0.000 





   0.922***  0.000    0.850***  0.000    0.875***  0.000 
    (0.042)      (0.056)      (0.058)   




  EIPV 
Mobilization 
[with 
  EIPV - 
EDay 
Voting [no 
  EIPV - 
EDay 
Voting 
  EIPV - 
Pre-EDay 
Voting [no 
















   0.366***  0.000    0.647***  0.000    0.064  0.265 
    (0.043)      (0.063)      (0.057)   
Constant -2.307***  0.000 -4.662***  0.000 -2.998***  0.000 -5.251***  0.000 -3.103***  0.000 -5.519***  0.000 
 (0.029)   (0.139)   (0.040)   (0.216)   (0.042)   (0.179)   
N 42131.000   42131.000   42131.000   42131.000   42131.000   42131.000   
Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC. 
Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect. 
The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect). 
^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models. 
One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect. 






























Table S 4: Logistic Regression for Average Treatment Effect on Turnout in 2014 Primary Election Based on Mobilization Type 




























 b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p 








0.441 0.150** 0.032 0.002 0.166** 0.034 0.001 
 (0.048)   (0.051)   (0.177)   (0.177)   (0.048)   (0.051)   
Make A 
Plan 




0.244 0.110* 0.023 0.023 0.114* 0.023 0.026 
 (0.048)   (0.051)   (0.180)   (0.180)   (0.048)   (0.051)   
Female    0.015  0.764    -0.068  0.705    0.022  0.677 
    (0.051)      (0.180)      (0.052)   
Age    0.018***  0.000    0.001  0.901    0.019***  0.000 
    (0.002)      (0.007)      (0.002)   
African 
American^ 
   -0.023  0.730    0.189  0.384    -0.039  0.552 
    (0.065)      (0.217)      (0.066)   
Hispanic^    -0.089  0.174    -0.344  0.210    -0.068  0.305 





   0.590***  0.000    0.730  0.153    0.566***  0.000 





   1.092***  0.000    0.164  0.371    1.100***  0.000 





   0.412***  0.000    0.236  0.246    0.411***  0.000 





   0.846***  0.000    0.148  0.408    0.854***  0.000 





   -0.262***  0.001    0.387  0.287    -0.289***  0.000 








   0.409***  0.000    0.530**  0.005    0.381***  0.000 
    (0.049)      (0.191)      (0.050)   
Constant -0.794***  0.000 -3.057***  0.000 -4.032***  0.000 -5.683***  0.000 -0.876***  0.000 -3.108***  0.000 
 (0.034)   (0.159)   (0.121)   (0.675)   (0.035)   (0.161)   
N 12047.000   12047.000   12047.000   12047.000   12047.000   12047.000   
Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC. 
Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect. 
The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect). 
^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models. 
One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect. 

































Table S 5: Average Treatment Effect on Method of Voting in 2014 Primary Election in AZ 


























 b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p 




0.112 0.023 0.105 0.136 0.026 0.073 0.076 0.003 0.609 0.083 0.003 0.584 0.106 0.020 0.144 0.125 0.021 0.112 











0.900 0.001 0.000 0.988 -0.007 -
0.001 
0.933 
 (0.070)   (0.076)   (0.152)   (0.154)   (0.074)   (0.079)   
Female    0.047  0.521    -0.327*  0.016    0.151*  0.047 
    (0.073)      (0.136)      (0.076)   
Age    0.023***  0.000    0.020***  0.000    0.018***  0.000 
    (0.003)      (0.005)      (0.003)   
African 
American^ 
   0.275  0.086    0.399  0.168    0.179  0.280 
    (0.160)      (0.289)      (0.166)   
Hispanic^    -0.114  0.248    -0.070  0.735    -0.103  0.314 





   1.150***  0.000    1.253**  0.007    1.046***  0.000 





   1.531***  0.000    0.549**  0.001    1.500***  0.000 





   0.704***  0.000    0.873***  0.000    0.614***  0.000 





   1.105***  0.000    0.566***  0.000    1.070***  0.000 





   -0.488***  0.000    0.027  0.931    -0.524***  0.000 
    (0.121)      (0.307)      (0.125)   







    (0.084)      (0.190)      (0.088)   
Constant -0.922***  0.000 -4.200***  0.000 -3.054***  0.000 -6.456***  0.000 -1.156***  0.000 -4.066***  0.000 
 (0.049)   (0.239)   (0.107)   (0.598)   (0.052)   (0.245)   
N 6081.000   6081.000   6081.000   6081.000   6081.000   6081.000   
Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC. 
Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect. 
The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect). 
^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models. 
One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect. 




Table S 6: Average Treatment Effect on Method of Voting in 2014 Primary Election in FL 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
 Overall 
Turnou




  Overall 
Turnou




  EDay 
Turnou




  EDay 
Turnou




  EIPV 
Turnou




  EIPV 
Turnou

















 b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p b/se dc p 
















































































 (0.070)   (0.076)   (0.152)   (0.154)   (0.074)   (0.079)   (0.033)   (0.035)   
Female    0.047  0.5
21 
   -0.327*  0.0
16 
   0.151*  0.0
47 
   0.034  0.3
31 
    (0.073)      (0.136)      (0.076)      (0.035)   




















   0.275  0.0
86 
   0.399  0.1
68 
   0.179  0.2
80 





    (0.160)      (0.289)      (0.166)      (0.035)   
Hispani
c^ 
   -0.114  0.2
48 
   -0.070  0.7
35 
   -0.103  0.3
14 
















   1.253**  0.0
07 



















   0.549**  0.0
01 





































































   0.027  0.9
31 




















   0.458*  0.0
16 





































































Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC. 
Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect. 
The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect). 
^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models. 
One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect. 
















Table S 7: Heterogeneity by Drop Off Voter Status in Intent-to-Treat Effect on Turnout in 2014 
Primary Election 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  





 Florida [no 
covariates] 
 Florida [with 
Covariates] 
 
 b/se p b/se p b/se p b/se p 
         
Make A Plan 0.260 0.133 0.279 0.142 0.097* 0.011 0.107** 0.006 
 (0.173)  (0.190)  (0.038)  (0.039)  
Interaction: Plan Making 
Treatment & Non-Targeted 
2014 Drop Off Voter 
-0.321 0.091 -0.347 0.094     
 (0.190)  (0.207)      
Interaction: Plan Making 
Treatment & Targeted 2014 
Drop Off Voter 
0.000 . 0.000 . 0.094 0.264 0.080 0.355 
 (.)  (.)  (0.084)  (0.087)  
Voter Report Card 0.123 0.486 0.059 0.758 0.060 0.115 0.070 0.076 
 (0.176)  (0.193)  (0.038)  (0.039)  
Interaction: Voter Report Card 
Treatment & Non-Targeted 
2014 Drop Off Voter 
-0.002 0.991 0.092 0.662     
 (0.193)  (0.210)      
Interaction: Voter Report Card 
and Targeted 2014 Drop Off 
Voter 
0.000 . 0.000 . 0.092 0.276 0.077 0.375 
 (.)  (.)  (0.085)  (0.087)  
Not a Targeted 2014 Drop Off 
Voter 
1.264*** 0.000 -0.232 0.625     
 (0.139)  (0.476)      
Targeted 2014 Drop Off Voter 0.000 . 0.000 . -0.963*** 0.000 0.029 0.950 
 (.)  (.)  (0.061)  (0.462)  
Female   0.049 0.505   0.034 0.333 
   (0.073)    (0.035)  
Age   0.023*** 0.000   0.018*** 0.000 
   (0.003)    (0.001)  
African American^   0.273 0.089   -0.274*** 0.000 
   (0.160)    (0.035)  
Hispanic^   -0.114 0.245   -0.434*** 0.000 
   (0.099)    (0.053)  
Voted in 2012 General 
Election 
  1.150*** 0.000   0.915*** 0.000 
   (0.170)    (0.083)  
Voted in 2012 Primary 
Election 
  1.532*** 0.000   1.335*** 0.000 
   (0.084)    (0.034)  
Voted in 2010 General 
Election 
  1.021* 0.029   0.423 0.357 
   (0.467)    (0.459)  
Voted in 2010 Primary 
Election 
  1.107*** 0.000   0.845*** 0.000 
   (0.069)    (0.036)  
Voted in 2008 General 
Election 
  -0.490*** 0.000   -0.166** 0.004 
   (0.121)    (0.057)  
Voted in 2006 General 
Election 
  0.445*** 0.000   0.289*** 0.000 
   (0.084)    (0.035)  
Constant -1.917*** 0.000 -4.274*** 0.000 -1.722*** 0.000 -4.476*** 0.000 
 (0.128)  (0.260)  (0.027)  (0.473)  
N 6081.000  6081.000  48097.000  48097.000  
Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC. 




The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect). 
^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models. 
One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect. 



































































Table S 8: Heterogeneity by Prior Pre-Election Day Voting in Intent-to-Treat Effect on Turnout 
in 2014 Primary Election 




















 b/se p b/se p b/se p b/se p 
Voter Report 
Card Treatment 
-0.050 0.503 -0.055 0.474 -0.120 0.518 -0.118 0.542 
 (0.075)  (0.077)  (0.185)  (0.194)  
Plan Making 
Treatment 
0.034 0.645 0.045 0.551 -0.285 0.131 -0.250 0.203 
 (0.073)  (0.075)  (0.189)  (0.197)  
1/4 Early Voter 0.335*** 0.000 0.261** 0.005 0.104 0.498 -0.016 0.919 
 (0.091)  (0.093)  (0.154)  (0.162)  
2/4 Early Voter 0.730*** 0.000 0.521*** 0.000 0.332* 0.021 0.007 0.962 
 (0.087)  (0.091)  (0.143)  (0.152)  
3/4 Early Voter 0.862*** 0.000 0.615*** 0.000 0.735*** 0.000 0.251 0.103 
 (0.078)  (0.082)  (0.144)  (0.154)  
4/4 Early Voter 1.442*** 0.000 0.842*** 0.000 1.200*** 0.000 0.417* 0.011 
 (0.122)  (0.128)  (0.153)  (0.164)  
Interaction: Voter 
Report Card & 
1/4 Early Voter 
0.075 0.556 0.101 0.445 0.321 0.143 0.323 0.160 
 (0.128)  (0.132)  (0.219)  (0.230)  
Interaction: Voter 
Report Card & 
2/4 Early Voter 
0.342** 0.004 0.389** 0.002 0.357 0.081 0.382 0.075 
 (0.120)  (0.124)  (0.205)  (0.215)  
Interaction: Voter 
Report Card & 
3/4 Early Voter 
0.056 0.613 0.070 0.541 0.267 0.195 0.274 0.204 
 (0.111)  (0.114)  (0.206)  (0.216)  
Interaction: Voter 
Report Card & 
4/4 Early Voter 
0.174 0.307 0.058 0.744 0.097 0.656 0.120 0.599 
 (0.171)  (0.176)  (0.219)  (0.229)  
Interaction: Plan 
Making & 1/4 
Early Voter 
0.197 0.114 0.197 0.124 0.446* 0.045 0.361 0.121 
 (0.124)  (0.128)  (0.223)  (0.232)  
Interaction: Plan 
Making & 2/4 
Early Voter 
0.086 0.482 0.109 0.384 0.523* 0.012 0.519* 0.017 
 (0.122)  (0.126)  (0.208)  (0.217)  
Interaction: Plan 
Making & 3/4 
Early Voter 
0.079 0.465 0.046 0.682 0.342 0.104 0.291 0.183 
 (0.108)  (0.112)  (0.210)  (0.219)  
Interaction: Plan 
Making & 4/4 
Early Voter 
0.005 0.978 -0.028 0.872 0.260 0.240 0.244 0.289 
 (0.170)  (0.176)  (0.221)  (0.230)  
Female   -0.041 0.328   0.019 0.719 
   (0.042)    (0.052)  
Age   0.012*** 0.000   0.018*** 0.000 
   (0.002)    (0.002)  
African 
American^ 
  -0.384*** 0.000   -0.014 0.832 
   (0.044)    (0.066)  
Hispanic^   -0.671*** 0.000   -0.078 0.234 
   (0.071)    (0.066)  
Voted in 2012 
General Election 
  0.798*** 0.000   0.392*** 0.001 
   (0.106)    (0.119)  
Voted in 2012 
Primary Election 
  1.319*** 0.000   1.073*** 0.000 




Voted in 2010 
General Election 
  0.408*** 0.000   0.364*** 0.000 
   (0.050)    (0.055)  
Voted in 2010 
Primary Election 
  0.892*** 0.000   0.808*** 0.000 
   (0.043)    (0.051)  
Voted in 2008 
General Election 
  -0.301*** 0.000   -0.331*** 0.000 
   (0.073)    (0.079)  
Voted in 2006 
General Election 
  0.351*** 0.000   0.362*** 0.000 
   (0.044)    (0.051)  
Constant -2.753*** 0.000 -4.493*** 0.000 -1.309*** 0.000 -2.845*** 0.000 
 (0.052)  (0.145)  (0.128)  (0.198)  
N 42,131  42,131  12,047  12,047  
 
Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC. 
Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect. 
The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect). 
^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models. 
One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect. 

































16 Nassau 134,721 33.5% 22.8% 4.1% 39.6% 80.5% 1.1% 4.3% 13.3% 
26 Queens 115,263 41.7% 15.8% 3.7% 38.8% 68.2% 0.6% 8.3% 21.9% 
28 Queens 113,219 42.9% 13.4% 3.7% 39.9% 67.4% 1.8% 15.6% 13.5% 
31 Queens 100,934 57.7% 4.5% 2.4% 35.5% 7.9% 64.8% 15.0% 8.1% 
33 Queens 120,276 59.5% 5.6% 2.5% 32.5% 12.2% 65.3% 8.8% 11.7% 
36 Queens 112,548 49.1% 8.8% 4.0% 38.1% 71.1% 1.3% 17.6% 8.1% 
51 Kings 87,246 54.1% 7.2% 3.3% 35.5% 33.9% 6.8% 44.2% 13.1% 
53 Kings 105,686 66.0% 4.2% 3.4% 26.4% 32.4% 9.8% 51.6% 4.8% 
71 New York 130,313 67.7% 4.1% 3.2% 24.9% 22.2% 37.2% 37.7% 1.6% 
82 Bronx 120,970 52.1% 10.0% 3.5% 34.4% 41.2% 25.4% 29.7% 2.1% 
86 Bronx 92,531 65.1% 3.8% 2.2% 28.9% 2.5% 33.9% 61.7% 0.6% 
89 Westchester 121,798 54.0% 8.7% 3.7% 33.6% 27.7% 50.3% 18.9% 1.3% 
91 Westchester 123,548 34.7% 18.8% 5.2% 41.3% 76.0% 5.6% 15.6% 1.8% 
104 
Dutchess/ 
Orange 107,373 36.3% 19.2% 5.9% 38.6% 65.9% 18.7% 13.4% 0.8% 
108 
Albany/ 
Renesslaer/Saratoga 117,274 45.5% 10.7% 8.0% 35.8% 71.6% 22.4% 4.1% 1.0% 
140 
Erie/ 




Table S 10: Logistic Regression for Average Treatment Effect on Patch Through Rate 
 (1) 
Patch-Through Experiment [no 
covariates] 
(2) 
Patch-Through Experiment [with 
covariates] 
 
 b/se dc p b/se dc p 




 (0.087)   (0.088)   
Identity Script 0.015 0.004 0.861 0.012 0.003 0.890 
 (0.087)   (0.087)   




 (0.087)   (0.088)   
Female    0.040  0.538 
    (0.064)   
African 
American^ 
   -0.184  0.245 
    (0.159)   
White    -0.189  0.223 
    (0.155)   
Hispanic^    -0.032  0.851 
    (0.173)   
Age    -0.004  0.104 
    (0.002)   
Voted in 2014 
GE 
   -0.014  0.849 
    (0.075)   
Voted in 2012 
GE 
   -0.020  0.870 
    (0.123)   
Voted in 2010 
GE 
   0.171  0.079 
    (0.097)   
Voted in 2008 
GE 
   -0.216  0.117 
    (0.138)   
Constant -0.530***  0.000 -0.064  0.808 
 (0.061)   (0.262)   
N 4487 4486 
 
Notes: Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect. 
^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models. 










Achtziger, A., Gollwitzer, P., & Sheeran, P. (2008). Implementation intentions and shielding 
goal striving from unwanted thoughts and feelings. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 34(3), 381-393. 
Agbede , F. (2011, April 4). The importance of unions for workers of color. Center for 
American Progress.  Retrieved from 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2011/04/04/9402/the-
importance-of-unions-for-workers-of-color/ 
Alford, R. R., & Lee, E. C. (1968). Voting turnout in American cities. The American 
Political Science Review, 796-813.  
Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in 
Five Nations. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
Analysis of Turnout in the 1996 U.S. National Election.  Public Choice, 111 (3-4), 259-83.  
Ansolabehere, S., & Snyder, J. (2006). Party control of state government and the distribution 
of public expenditures. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108(4), 547-569. 
Arceneaux, K. (2006). The federal face of voting: Are elected officials held accountable for 
the functions relevant to their office? Political Psychology, 27(5), 731-754.  
Arceneaux, K., & Nickerson, D. W. (2009). Who is mobilized to vote? A Re-Analysis of 11 




Asher, H. B. (2001). American labor unions in the electoral arena. Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. 
Baccaro, L., Hamann, K., & Turner, L. (2003). The politics of labour movement revitalization: 
The need for a revitalized perspective. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 9(1), 
119-133. 
Bennion, E. A. (2005). Caught in the ground wars: Mobilizing voters during a competitive 
congressional campaign. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 601(1), 123-141.  
Bergan, D. E., Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P., & Panagopoulous, C. (2005). Grassroots mobilization 
and voter turnout in 2004. Public Opinion Quarterly, 69(5), 760-777. 
Bergan, D. E. (2009). Does grassroots lobbying work? A field experiment measuring the effects 
of an e-mail lobbying campaign on legislative behavior. American Politics Research, 
37(2), 327-52. 
Bergen, D. E., & Cole, R. T. (2014). Call your legislator: A field experimental study of the 
impact of citizen contact on legislative voting. Political Behavior, 37(1), 27–42. 
Bond, Robert, Christopher Fariss, Jason Jones, Adam Kramer, Cameron Marlow, Jaime Settle, 
and James Fowler. (2012). A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and 
Political Mobilization. Nature, 489: 295-298. 
Brady, D. W., Han, H., & Pope, J. C. (2007). Primary elections and candidate ideology: Out of 




Brehm, S. S., & Brehm, J. W. (2013). Psychological reactance: A theory of freedom and control. 
Academic Press. 
Bridges, A. (1997). Textbook municipal reform. Urban Affairs Review, 33(1), 97-119. 
Brody, R. A. (1978). The puzzle of political participation in America. The new American political 
system, 287-324. 
Broockman, D. E. (2014). Distorted communication, unequal representation: Constituents 
communicate less to representatives not of their race. American Journal of Political Science, 
58(2), 307-321. 
Broockman, D. E., & Butler, D. M. (2014). How Do Citizens React When Politicians Support 
Policies They Oppose? Field Experiments with Elite Communication. Working Paper, 
Washington University in St. Louis. 
Broockman, D., & Kalla, J. (2014, November). Experiments show this is the best way to win 
campaigns. But is anyone actually doing it? Vox Media.  Retrieved from 
http://www.vox.com/2014/11/13/7214339/campaign-ground-game. 
Broockman, D. E., & Ryan, T. J. (2016). Preaching to the choir: Americans prefer communicating to 
copartisan elected officials. American Journal of Political Science, 60(4), 1093-1107. 
Burden, B. C., Canon, D. T., Lavertu, S., Mayer, K. R., & Moynihan, D. P. (2013). Selection 
Method, Partisanship, and the Administration of Elections. American Politics Research, 
41(6), 903-936.  
Butler, D. M., & Nickerson, D. W. (2011). Can learning constituency opinion affect how legislators 




Cardy, E. A. (2005). An experimental field study of the GOTV and persuasion effects of partisan 
direct mail and phone calls. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, (601), 28-40. 
Clawson, Dan, and Mary Ann Clawson. (1999). What has happened to the US labor movement: 
union decline and renewal. Annual Review of Sociology, 25:95-119.  
Clawson, D. (2003). The next upsurge: Labor and the new social movements. Cornell University 
Press. 
Conover, P. J., & Feldman, S. (1986). The role of inference in the perception of political candidates. 
Political cognition, 19. 
Converse, P. E., Clausen, A. R., & Miller, W. E. (1965). Electoral myth and realist: the 1964 
election. American Political Science Review, 59(02), 321-336. 
Corey, E. C., & Garand, J. C. (2002). Are government employees more likely to vote?: An analysis 
of turnout in the 1996 US national election. Public Choice, 111(3-4), 259-283.  
Cornwell, B., & Harrison, J. A. (2004). Union members and voluntary associations: Membership 
overlap as a case of organizational embeddedness. American Sociological Review, 69(6), 
862-881. 
Cotterill, S., John, P., Liu, H., & Nomura, H. (2009). Mobilizing citizen effort to enhance 
environmental outcomes: A randomized controlled trial of a door-to-door recycling 
campaign. Journal of Environmental Management, 91(2), 403-410. 




Druckman, J. N., Green, D. P., Kuklinski, J. H., & Lupia, A. (2011). Cambridge Handbook of 
Experimental Political Science. Cambridge, England:  Cambridge University Press. 
Eldersveld, S. J. (1956). Experimental propaganda techniques and voting behavior. American 
Political Science Review, 50(01), 154-165. 
Fantasia, R. (1989). Cultures of solidarity: Consciousness, action, and contemporary American 
workers. Univ of California Press. 
Fenno, R. F. (1977). U.S. House members in their constituencies: An exploration. American 
Political Science Review, 71(3), 883-917. 
Fenno, R. E. (1978). Home style: House members in their districts. Boston, MA: Little Brown. 
Fiorina, M. P. (1999, October). Whatever happened to the median voter? MIT conference on parties 
and congress, Name of Journal, 2, 1999. 
Fowler, J. H. (2005). 14 Turnout in a Small World. The social logic of politics: Personal networks as 
contexts for political behavior, 269. 
Fowler, L. L., & Shaiko, R. G. (1987). The grass roots connection: Environmental activists and 
senate roll calls. American Journal of Political Science, 31(3), 484-510. 
Galderisi, P. F., Ezra, M., & Lyons, M. (2001). Congressional primaries and the politics of 
representation. Rowman & Littlefield. 




Garden, C. (2016, February 16). What will become of public sector unions now? The Atlantic. 
Retrieved from  http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/scalia-
friedrichs/462936/ 
Gerber, A. S., & Green, D. P. (2000). The effects of canvassing, telephone calls, and direct mail on 
voter turnout: A field experiment. American Political Science Review, 94(03), 653-663. 
Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P., & Nickerson, D. (2001). Testing for publication bias in political science. 
Political Analysis, 9(4), 385-392.  
Gerber, D. P., Green, A. S., & Nickerson, D. W. (2003). Getting out the vote in local elections: 
Results from six door-to-door canvassing experiments. Journal of Politics, 65(4), 1083-1096. 
Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P., & Larimer, C. W. (2008). Social pressure and voter turnout: Evidence 
from a large-scale field experiment. American Political Science Review, 102(01), 33-48. 
Gerber, A. S., & Rogers, T. (2009). Descriptive social norms and motivation to vote: Everybody's 
voting and so should you. The Journal of Politics, 71(01), 178-191. 
Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P., & Larimer, C. W. (2010). An experiment testing the relative 
effectiveness of encouraging voter participation by inducing feelings of pride or shame. 
Political Behavior, 32(3), 409-422. 
Goldfield, M. (1989). The decline of organized labor in the United States. Chicago, Illinois:  
University of Chicago Press. 
Goldstein, K. M. (1999). Interest groups, lobbying, and participation in America. New York: 




Goldstein, K. M., & Ridout, T. N. (2002). The politics of participation: Mobilization and turnout 
over time. Political Behavior, 24(1), 3-29. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions: strong effects of simple plans. American 
Psychologist, 54(7), 493. 
Gosnell, H. F. (1927). Getting out the vote: An experiment in the stimulation of voting (No. 4). 
Greenwood Pub Group. 
Green, D. P., McGrath, M. C., & Aronow, P. M. (2013). Field experiments and the study of voter 
turnout. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, 23(1), 27-48. 
Greenstone, J. David. 1969. Labor in American Politics. Chicago, Illinois:  University of Chicago 
Press.  
Greenwald, A. G., Carnot, C. G., & Young, B. (1987). Increasing voting behavior by asking people 
if they expect to vote. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72(2), 315. 
Gronke, P., Galanes-Rosenbaum, E., Miller, P. A., & Toffey, D. (2008). Convenience 
voting. Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 437-455. 
Hacker, J. S., & Pierson, P. (2005). Abandoning the middle: The Bush tax cuts and the limits of 
democratic control. Perspectives on Politics, 3(01), 33-53. 
Hainai, Z. L., & Lewis, P. G. (2003). Municipal institutions and voter turnout in local elections. 




Hancock, Jason. (2016, June 16). Labor unions are spending big on Chris Koster’s campaign for 
Missouri Governor.  The Kansas City Star. Retrieved from www.kansascity.com: 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/the-buzz/article84202272.html 
Hayes, D., & Lawless, J. L. (2015). As local news goes, so goes citizen engagement: Media, 
knowledge, and participation in US House Elections. The Journal of Politics, 77(2), 447-462.  
Heggie, E. (2017, January). Personal Interview. 
Herrnson, P. S., Koh, H. Y., Hanmer, M. J., & Smith, C. (2015). Message, milieu, technology, and 
turnout among military and overseas voters. Electoral Studies, 39, 142-152. 
Holland, R. W., Aarts, H., & Langendam, D. (2006). Breaking and creating habits on the working 
floor: A field-experiment on the power of implementation intentions. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 42(6), 776-783. 
Jackman, R. W. (1987). Political institutions and voter turnout in the industrial democracies. 
American Political Science Review, 81(02), 405-423. 
Jason, L. A., Rose, T., Ferrari, J. R., & Barone, R. (1984). Personal versus impersonal methods for 
recruiting blood donations. The Journal of Social Psychology, 123(1), 139-140. 
Juravich, T., & Shergold, P. R. (1988). The impact of unions on the voting behavior of their 
members. ILR Review, 41(3), 374-385. 
Kerrissey, J., & Schofer, E. (2013). Union membership and political participation in the United 
States. Social forces, 91(3), 895-928. 




Klofstad, C. A. (2010). The lasting effect of civic talk on civic participation: Evidence from a panel 
study. Social Forces, 88(5), 2353-2375. 
Kollman, K. (1998). Outside Lobbying. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Lazarsfeld, P. F., & Rosenberg, M. (1949). The Contribution of the Regional Poll to Political 
Understanding. Public Opinion Quarterly, 13(4), 569-586. 
Lamare, J. R. (2016). Union experience and worker policy: Legislative behavior in California, 1999–
2012. ILR review, 69(1), 113-141. 
Leblanc-Jackson, N. (2015, December 12). Personal Interview. 
Lee, T. (2002). Mobilizing public opinion: Black insurgency and racial attitudes in the Civil Rights 
era. Chicago, Illinois: Chicago University Press. 
Leighley, J. E., & Nagler, J. (2007, April). Who votes now? And does it matter?. In annual meeting 
of the Midwest Political Science Association. 
Leighley, Jan E., and Jonahan Nagler. (2007). Unions, voter turnout, and class bias in the electorate, 
1964-2004.  The Journal of Politics, 69:430-41.  
Lijphart, A. (1997). Unequal participation: Democracy's unresolved dilemma presidential address, 
American Political Science Association, 1996. American political science review, 91(01), 1-
14.  
Mann, C. B. (2005). Do advance letters improve pre-election forecast accuracy? Public Opinion 




Mann, C. B., & Sondheimer, R. M. (2009). Cost effective voter education by Clerks in All Mail 
Voting Settings. Pew Center on the States. Washington, D.C. 
Mann, C. B. (2010). Is there backlash to social pressure? A large-scale field experiment on voter 
mobilization. Political Behavior (32), 387-408. 
Mann, C. B. (2012). When Election Day is two weeks long: A large scale field experiment on 
mobilization for early voting. State Politics and Policy Conference. Houston. 
Mann, C. B., & Klofstad, C. A. (2012). Our house is a very, very, very fine house: Examining call-
respondent interactions and call center 'house effects' in a voter mobilization field 
experiment. University of Miami. 
Mann, C. B. & Casey A. Klofstad. (2012). Voter mobilization through friends and family: A large 
scale field experiment on the social nature of political participation.   Paper presented at the 
2012 Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. 
Mann, C. B., & Mayhew, G. (2012). Multiple voting methods, multiple mobilization opportunities? 
Voting behavior, institutional reform, and mobilization strategy. Southern Political Science 
Association.  
Mann, C. B. (2013). Get the vote in the mail: Experiments in getting out the vote using no excuse 
absentee voting. Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans. 
Mann, C. B., & Kalla, J. (2013). Prompting Participation by Reducing Cost or Increasing 
Motivation: A Field Experiment on Encouraging Different Modes of Voting. Midwest 




Mann,  C.  B.,  Anand  E.  Sokhey  and  Genevieve  Mayhew. (2014). Politics  at  the  water-cooler: 
A field experiment on information transmission in workplace social networks. Midwest 
Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2014. 
Mann, C. B., & Mayhew, G. (2015). Voter mobilization meets Egovernment: Turnout and voting by 
mail from online or paper ballot request. Journal of Political Marketing, 14(4), 352-380.  
Matthews, J. (2017). Personal Interview. 
McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2006). Polarized America: The dance of ideology and 
unequal riches (Vol. 5). Cambridge:  MIT Press. 
McDermott, Kevin. (2016, August 29). Right to work debate puts national spotlight on Missouri’s 
governors race.  St. Louis Post Dispatch.  Retrieved from 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/right-to-work-debate-puts-national-
spotlight-on-missouri-governor/article_dc8ebece-40f7-5062-9e2c-f53b988c0d3a.html 
McDermott, R. (2002). Experimental methodology in political science. Political Analysis , 10(4), 
325-342. 
McDonald, M. P., & Popkin, S. L. (2001). The myth of the vanishing voter. American Political 
Science Review, 95(4), 963-974. 
McDonald, M. P. (2014). Presidential vote within state legislative districts. State Politics and Policy 
Quarterly, 14(2), 196-204. 




McNulty, J. E. (2002). What's on the line? Field experiments with varied partisan components. The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 601(1), 41-65. 
Michelson , M. R. (2003). Getting out the Latino vote: How door-to-door canvassing influences 
voter turnout in rural central California . Political Behavior, 25(3), 247-263. 
Michelson, M. R. (2005). Meeting the challenges of Latino voter mobilization. The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 601(1), 85-101. 
Michelson, M. R. (2006). Mobilizing the Latino youth vote: Some experimental results. Social 
Science Quarterly, 87(5), 1188-1206. 
Michelson, M. R., & Nickerson, D. W. (2011). Voter mobilization. Cambridge Handbook of 
Experimental Political Science, 228. 
Michelson, M. R., & García Bedolla, L. (2014). Mobilization by Different Means: Nativity and 
GOTV in the United States. International Migration Review, 48(3), 710-727. 
Middleton, J. A., & Green, D. P. (2008). Do community-based voter mobilization campaigns work 
even in battleground states? Evaluating the effectiveness of MoveOn’s 2004 outreach 
campaign. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3(1), 63-82.  
Miller, K. (2010). Constituency representation in Congress: The view from Capitol Hill. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Morlan, R. L. (1984). Municipal vs. national election voter turnout: Europe and the United States. 
Political Science Quarterly, 99(3), 457-470. 




Morwitz, V. G., Johnson, E., & Schmittlein, D. (1993). Does measuring intent change behavior? 
Journal of Consumer Research, 46-61. 
Morwitz, V. G., & Fitzsimons, G. J. (2004). The mere-measurement effect: Why does measuring 
intentions change actual behavior? Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14(1), 64-74. 
National Council of State Legislatures. (2012, January 11). Absentee and Early Voting. Retrieved 
from http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16604 
Neeley, G. W., & Richardson, L. E. (2001). Who is early voting? An individual level examination. 
Social Science Journal, 38, 381-392. 
Nelson, L. D., & Norton, M. I. (2005). From student to superhero: Situational primes shape future 
helping. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41(4), 423-430. 
Nicholas, P. (2008, October 28). Early Turnout Defies Trends. Los Angeles Times. 
Nickerson, D. W., Friedrichs, R. D., & King , D. C. (2006). Partisan mobilization campaigns in the 
field: Results from a statewide turnout experiment in Michigan. Political Science Quarterly, 
59(1), 85-97. 
Nickerson, D. W. (2007). Quality is job one: Professional and volunteer voter mobilization calls. 
American Journal of Political Science, 51(2), 269-282. 
Nickerson, D. W. (2007). The ineffectiveness of e-vites to democracy field experiments testing the 
role of e-mail on voter turnout. Social Science Computer Review, 25(4), 494-503.  
Nickerson, D. W. (2008). Is Voting contagious? Evidence from two field experiments. American 




Nickerson, D. W., & Rogers, T. (2010). Do you have a voting plan? Implementation intentions, 
voter turnout, and organic plan making. Psychological Science, 21(2), 194-199.  
Nickerson, D. W. (2011). When the client owns the data. The experimental political scientists: 
Newsletter of the APSA Experimental Section, 2(2), 5-6. 
Nickerson, D. W., & Rogers, T. (2010). Do you have a voting plan? Implementation intentions, 
voter turnout, and organic plan making. Psychological Science, 21(2), 194-199.  
Nissen, B. (2009). Political activism as part of a broader civic engagement: the case of SEIU Florida 
Healthcare Union. Labor Studies Journal. 
Niven, D. (2004). The Mobilization solution: Face-to-face contact and voter turnout in a municipal 
election. Journal of Politics, 66(3), 868. 
Nordlinger, G. (2003). Early voting: How it's changing campaign strategies, timing, and costs. 
Campaigns and Elections, 24(7), 27-29. 
Oliver, J. E. (1996). The effects of eligibility restrictions and party activity on absentee voting and 
overall turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 498-513. 
Panagopoulos, C. (2009). Street fight: The impact of a street sign campaign on voter 
turnout. Electoral Studies, 28(2), 309-313.  
Portland State University. (2016). Who Votes for Mayor? Retrieved from 
http://www.whovotesformayor.org/ 
Powell, G. B. (1986). American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective. American Political 




Putnam, R. D. (2001). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York 
City, NY:  Simon and Schuster. 
Reams, M. A., & Brooks, H. R. (1993). The effects of three prompting methods on recycling 
participation rates: A field study. Journal of Environmental Systems, 22(4), 371-79. 
Rogers, T., Fox, C. R., & Gerber, A. S. (2012). Rethinking why people vote: Voting as dynamic 
social expression. Behavioral Foundations of Policy, 91-107. 
Rosenstone, S. J., & Hansen, J. M. (1993). Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America, 
New York, NY: Mac Millan.  
Rotolo, Thomas, and John Wilson. (2006). “Employment sector and volunteering: The contribution 
of nonprofit and public sector workers to the volunteer labor force.  The Sociological 
Quarterly, 47(1):21-40.  
Sherman, S. J., & Gorkin, L. (1980). Attitude bolstering when behavior is inconsistent with central 
attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16(4), 388-403. 
Sinclair, Betsy. 2012. The social citizen: Peer networks and political behavior. Chicago, Illinois:  
Chicago UP. 
Sinclair, B., McConnell, M., & Green, D. P. (2012). Detecting spillover effects: Design and analysis 
of multilevel experiments. American Journal of Political Science, 56(4), 1055-1069. 
Sinclair, B., McConnell, M., & Michelson, M. R. (2013). Local canvassing: The efficacy of 




Skocpol, T., & Fiorina, M. P. (Eds.). (2004). Civic engagement in American democracy. Washington 
D.C.:  Brookings Institution Press. 
Sousa, D. J. (1993). Organized labor in the electorate, 1960-1988. Political Research 
Quarterly, 46(4), 741-758. 
Surowiecki, J. (2011, January 17). State of the Unions.  The New Yorker.   Retrieved from 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/17/state-of-the-unions 
Tapia, M. (2013). Marching to different tunes: Commitment and culture as mobilizing mechanisms 
of trade unions and community organizations. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 51(4), 
666-688. 
Taylor, J. (2010). Public service motivation, civic attitudes and actions of public, nonprofit and 
private sector employees. Public Administration, 88(4), 1083-1098. 
The Analyst Institute. (2013). Call Your Legislator Because Your Opinion Matters. Rootscamp. 
Washington, DC.. 
The Analyst Institute. (2014, May). Should my candidate canvass voters, and if so, when? Retrieved 
from https://members.analystinstitute.org/qna/ask-an-analyst-should-my-candidate-canvass-
voters-and-if-so-when-3567 
The Analyst Institute. (2016, June). Meta-Analysis of Persuasion Canvassing Effects. Retrieved from 
https://members.analystinstitute.org/research/meta-analysis-persuasion-canvassing-effects-
7717 





Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1972). Participation in America. New York:  Harper & Row. 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., Brady, H. E., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic 
voluntarism in American politics (Vol. 4). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., Brady, H. E., & Nie, N. (1995). American citizen participation study, 
1990 [computer file]. ICPSR version. Chicago: University of Chicago, National opinion 
research center [producer]. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university consortium for political and 
social research [distributor]. 
Wolfinger, R. E., & Rosenstone, S. J. (1980). Who Votes? New Haven, Connecticut:  Yale 
University Press. 
Zaller, John R. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press.
 
